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SUMMARY

Charter schools are one of the most recent education reform movements designed
to increase innovation, accountability and competition. Since the adoption of the first
charter law in 1991, the number of charter schools grew rapidly across United States. As
charter schools continue to proliferate, their impact on the public education system is
becoming an increasingly important public policy question. Charter school proponents
argue that combined pressures of consumer choice and market competition will induce
traditional public schools to respond by providing higher quality education and by
promoting innovation and equity. Skeptics worry that charter schools pose risks of
segregating students by race and economic level, and reducing per-pupil resources
available to traditional public schools. This dissertation provides a systematic and
comprehensive evaluation of the effects of charter schools on regular public schools by
addressing the following questions: 1) How do the charter schools affect the racial and
socio-economic distribution, student-teacher ratios and achievement of traditional public
schools? 2) How do the size and scope of competitive effects vary according to different
measures of competition?
This study uses two-period panel data from the National Center of Education
Statistics’ (NCES) Common Core Data (CCD) for traditional public schools in Florida,
New Jersey, Texas and Ohio for the 1995-96 and 2001-02 school years. The rapid
expansion of charter schools in these states in the last six to eight years resembles a
quasi-experiment, and this study uses a variation of the difference-in-differences (DD)
estimation strategy to compare changes in racial and ethnic distribution, student-teacher

x

ratios and achievement between the pre and post-charter legislation in public schools that
do and do not face competition. Three competition specifications are used: having at least
one charter schools in the same county as the public school, having at least one charter
school within the 5-mile radius of the public school, and being located in counties where
charter schools enroll more than the median percentage of public school students.
The findings from the study suggest that introduction of charter schools in the
educational landscape has affected student distributions, and at least in some cases,
student-teacher ratios and the performance of traditional public schools. Regression
results suggest that charter schools contribute to declines in the share of non-Hispanic
white students in traditional public schools in all four states. The results also show that
charter schools contribute to the reduction of the share of free-lunch eligible students in
traditional public schools in Texas, but increase the share of free-lunch eligible students
in Ohio. In Florida, the models show a significant increase in the share of free-lunch
eligible students only if the traditional public school has charter schools within its close
proximity. Results for New Jersey are not significant. The analyses show mixed effects
on student-teacher ratios in traditional public schools. Charter schools also seem to affect
test scores in opposite directions across Texas and Ohio. The analyses show that the
charter schools contribute to improvements in traditional public schools’ pass rates in
Texas, but public schools in Ohio experience overall negative effects. The findings
highlight the importance of monitoring what will happen to non-choosers in traditional
schools as well as the role of considering state context and empirical measures while
generalizing from charter school studies
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Policymakers seeking to enhance educational outcomes have adopted numerous
choice policies designed to increase competition in public education. Charter schools are
one of the most recent structural reform tools in the school choice movement designed to
increase innovation, accountability and competition. They have quickly become popular
and have rapidly increased in number. The earliest law was passed in 1991 in Minnesota,
and currently more than 3,000 charter schools operate in 37 states and the District of
Columbia, serving over 900,000 students ("The US Charter Schools", 2006, web source).
As charter schools proliferate across the country, concern about their effects on the
regular public schools grows. Despite this growing interest, most research on the
effectiveness of charter schools focuses on how well charter schools educate their own
students. The results are an inconclusive mix of positive, negative and mixed effects in
both statewide and national studies (Bifulco & Ladd, 2004; Hanushek, 2002; Hoxby,
2001, 2004; Miron & Nelson, 2001; Nathan, 1996; H. Nelson, Rosenberg, & Van Meter,
2004; Zimmer & Gill, 2004). This dissertation focuses on the equally important, but
relatively overlooked, systemic effects of charter schools on traditional public schools.
Focusing on Texas, Florida, New Jersey and Ohio, I examine the pre- and post-charter
legislation levels of racial and ethnic distribution, free-lunch eligible students, pupilteacher ratio, and achievement in public schools, comparing changes in those schools that
do and do not face competition. In order to investigate changes in these outcome
measures, I build a number of charter competition measures to assign public schools into
treatment and control groups. Then I estimate the difference between outcome measures
before and after the adoption of charter legislation in each state for both groups of
schools.

Statement of the Problem
Scholars on both sides of the school choice debate recognize that charter schools
will not only affect their own students, but will also create systemic changes in the larger
system of primary and secondary education, because public schools will respond to
competitive pressures. The studies on the role of competition in education rely mostly on
institutional theories of social change. Institutionalism is a very broad concept that
encompasses many alternative perspectives; however, Peters (2000, p. 4) emphasizes that
the most important argument binding various approaches is that structures do matter to
outcomes (March & Olsen, 1984; North, 1990; Wood & Waterman, 1991). Public
schools, as any other organizations, operate according to a set of rules and structures
prevailing in their environments. According to the institutional framework, we need to
change the institutions (rules and structures) to change educational outcomes.
Traditionally, the education system in the United States is a governmental system and the
school choice programs proposed and established in the United States are institutional
reforms aiming to change the structure of public education by introducing market-like
features in the system. The debate about the role of markets as a method of providing
education is not new. In 1962, Milton Friedman advocated vouchers for parents to enable
them to send ther children to schools of their choice in his classic book ‘Capitalism and
Freedom’. He argued that democratic control of schools creates government monopolies
that do not allow benefits from competition.
Chubb and Moe (1990) reignited interest in market-based solutions to education
problems by using a neo-institutional approach to frame their discussion about the
problems of public schools. The authors compare public and private schools, and argue
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that the problems of public education in the United States are caused by democratic
institutions of governance. Democratic control under a governmental system requires
many rules and regulations and this political process leads to excessive bureaucracy. The
bureaucratic nature of schools prevents them from addressing parental demands and
makes the schools inefficient. This line of reasoning is reminiscent of larger literature on
public organization responsiveness. Savas (1987), for example, argues that public sector
organizations are less likely to respond to their environments than private sector
organizations, because private organizations must compete to produce higher quality and
lower cost goods and services to stay in the market against their competitors. In contrast,
public organizations do not need to compete to survive and thus are less responsive or
even indifferent to their environments (Bast & Walberg, 2003). According to this
perspective, in order to achieve more favorable outcomes, we need different systems of
institutional control.
On the other hand, other researchers argue that public organizations can and do
respond to their environments (Wood & Waterman, 1993). In the school choice context,
Smith and Meier (1995) argue that public schools are capable of responding to their
environments and they do respond by creating more bureaucracy. They see bureaucracy
not as a cause of problems in public schools but rather as a response to parental demands
of increased performance. The authors also question the benefits of creating competition
to address parental demands. According to this alternative perspective, competition may
promote further stratification, especially if parents value factors other academic
performance (Smith & Meier, 1995).
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Most of the literature on competition in education looks at the effect of private
school competition on public school outcomes. Studies focused on private school
competition have found varying results in different contexts. Henry and Gordon (2003, p.
5) summarize the general conclusion that can be drawn from the private school
competition literature: ‘The primary hypothesis of pro-market theorists, that is, greater
competition for students leads to better student outcomes, remains open, with the
evidence to date indicating that the differences, when found, run slightly in favor of
competition.’
While the majority of the research focuses on private school competition, public
schools may actually be more responsive to competition from charter schools. Private
schools are still an alternative for a very limited number of public school students. The
proportion of students in private elementary and secondary schools has changed little
over the past 10 years (Wirt et al., 2005). The proportion of students served by the charter
schools, on the other hand, has increased rapidly in the last 10 years. While there were no
charter schools before 1991, in the 2001-02 school year, 2,348 charter schools provided
instruction to 1.2 percent of all public school students ("The US Charter Schools", 2006;
WestEd). The number of charter schools continues to accelerate. According to the Center
for Education Reform (CER), the number of charter schools across the country increased
by 11 percent from 2005 to 2006. Although they still serve a small proportion of students,
charter schools have quickly become a center of attention in the education reform
movement with their unique characteristics that differentiate them from the rest of public
schools. Four points are especially worth mentioning (Anderson et al., 2000; CER, 2005).
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First, unlike traditional schools, charter schools are independent public schools
established under a charter contract with a designated charter school authorizer such as
the local board of education or a specific charter authorization institution. Groups such as
teachers, parents, or for-profit or non-profit foundations can operate them. Second, they
are exempt from many regulations and restrictions that affect public schools, which make
them much more flexible. Charter schools can design and implement their own curricula
and use innovative teaching techniques or management practices. Third, charter schools
have entirely different accountability standards. They operate under limited-term and
performance-based contracts. The schools are accountable to achieve the performance
goals listed in their charter at the end of the contract period to get a renewal of their
contract (P. Hill et al., 2001). Finally, despite these distinctive qualities, charter schools
are public schools, funded with public money on a per-pupil basis. When a student leaves
a traditional public school to attend a charter school, public funding follows the student
from one type of school to the other. Private schools may take students from public
schools, but they do not directly influence public school budgets. Charter schools on the
other hand directly influence district budgets. With the ongoing expansion of charter
schools and given that they are funded by public money, they may be considered as more
direct competition for public schools. Some charter advocates even argue that charter
schools are specifically designed to extend the successful application of market-oriented
practices in the public sector to the education arena. While charter schools are still public
schools, the policy allows them to be free of bureaucratic constraints that affect other
public schools and to develop creative, innovative curriculum or to use new teaching
methods in hopes of attracting parents and students and becoming “public education’s
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R&D arm.” 1 Charter schools are presented as laboratories that can test and find new and
better approaches to education that may help transform the larger public education system
(DOE, 2004).
Proponents of charter schools make several claims about the effects of increased
competition. Bulkley and Fisler (2003) summarized different components of the charter
school reform in the following figure, which provides an outline of the chartering process
and the expected positive outcomes. Charter schools are designed to be accountable
through both government and the markets. They must meet performance goals set by the
government agencies that authorize them (Hill & Lake, 2002). However, as public
funding comes with the student, and families choose to enroll their children in charter
schools, a charter school is also accountable to parents. If a charter school fails to satisfy
parents, it risks losing students and funding. Charter schools also have substantial
freedom of action especially over curricular, staffing, and financial decisions (Hill et al. ,
2001). Combination of freedom and accountability provide incentives and opportunities
for charter school leaders to use innovations to increase quality (DOE, 2004). Bulkley
and Fisler (2003, p. 319) summarize the anticipated desirable outcomes as improved
student achievement in charter schools, higher parental and student satisfaction, higher
teacher satisfaction through empowerment, positive effects on the broader system of
public education and positive or neutral effects on educational equity. This study focuses
on the last two outcomes regarding the systemic impacts on the broader system of public
education.

1 The phrase is taken directly from U.S. Secretary of Education’s Foreword to Innovations in Education:
Successful Charter Schools report (in Foreword by Rod Paige, U.S. Secretary of Education).
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Desirable outcomes
including:
* Improved student
achievement

Creation of
new or
conversion
charter schools

*High parental and
student satisfaction
Adoption of
charter
school law

Creation of
schools with
more
autonomy

Innovation
and quality
in charter
schools

*High teacher/employee
satisfaction (through
empowerment)
*Positive effects on
broader system of public
education

Accountability
through
markets and
government

*Positive or neutral
effects on educational
equity

Figure 1.1. Common Elements of Charter School Theory, adopted from Bulkley and
Fisler (2003).
Competition and market-based theories, however, are not the only reasons
underlying support for charter school movement and systemic effects argument. Some
advocates of the choice approach envision choice schools as a means of improving
educational opportunities for disadvantaged groups and eliminating existing segregation
in the public school system (Coons & Sugarman, 1978; Jencks, 1970). Unlike regular
neighborhood schools, charters are generally open to all students, including those
residing outside their district. Therefore, charter schools allow students in poor
neighborhoods to switch to schools with more affluent peers. In this context, charter
schools have the potential to reduce the prevailing racial and class inequalities by
detaching where students go to school from where they live (Greene, 2000; Hassel, 1999;
Viteritti, 1999).
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Others see school choice as a means of individual growth. According to this
approach, individual differences in needs, interests and learning styles require diverse,
creative and innovative alternatives for education, and flexible charter schools may cater
to different needs of families and students (Bulman & Kirp, 1999; Goldhaber, Guin,
Henig, Hess, & Weiss, 2005; Henig & Sugarman, 1999).
Opponents of school choice argue that the economic theory is not completely
relevant to education markets, because of the public good characteristics of education and
the problems associated with creating a competitive market for schooling (Betts, 2005).
According to economic theory, in a competitive market, producers compete to produce
better products and services at lower costs, and this gives consumers greater selection of
products at lower prices. Consumers can shop around to compare price and quality to
make optimal decisions, and individual decisions by producers and consumers in a free
market create efficiency without government intervention. However, perfectly
competitive market model assumes a market for a homogeneous commodity and no
externalities in production or consumption. An externality occurs when a decision causes
costs or benefits to third parties. Some argue that education is different from other
material goods that are privately purchased or consumed, because consumption of
education affects the broader community by increasing the quality of the workforce,
national human capital and civic leadership, or by decreasing crime and poverty (Henig,
1994; Labaree, 2000). For private good with positive externalities, economic theory
predicts market failures in the form of underprovision and underconsumption (Goldhaber,
Guin, Henig, Hess, & Weiss, 2005).
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Other scholars argue that adopting market-based school choice can have
unintended consequences. First, charter schools drain resources from traditional public
schools. Operating a school requires some fixed costs regardless of the number of
students served. The funds transferred to charter schools may exceed the marginal costs
of providing schooling and the lost resources may reduce the funding allocated to the
classroom instruction. Additionally, if student and teacher turnover increase with
extended choice, this may also create additional educational inefficiencies (Goldhaber,
Guin, Henig, Hess, & Weiss, 2005). Second, charter schools may lead to increased
segregation of students by ability, race or class. If better students leave traditional public
schools, non-choosers may be deprived of positive peer effects. To the extent that
parents rely on racial and socio-economic composition of schools, rather than academic
outcomes, to make enrollment decisions for their children, we may observe further
balkanization in public schools.(Cobb & Glass, 1999; B. Fuller, 2000; Wells, 2002;
Wells, Holme, Lopez, & Cooper, 2000).
Finally, some scholars also voice concerns regarding the role of public schools in
civic education. Public schools act as critical components of civic democracy in United
States by offering common educational and cultural experiences to students and
preparing them as future citizens. Fuller (2000, p. 4), for example, argues that by
decentralizing authority through charter schools from the state to groups of parents and
charter school leaders with private interests, the strength of the public authority and the
common values maintained by that authority erode. Similarly, Abernathy (2005) states
that choice schools create a disconnected school system by allowing the most involved
parents to leave public schools for charter schools. The author argues that the drain of
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civic engagement hurts traditional schools and will have critical implications for the
future of citizenship and American democracy.
In sum, charter competition can induce change in public schools in three primary
ways. First, flexible and innovative charter schools may act as incubators of new ideas
and approaches, and regular public schools can adopt these changes (Nathan, 1996).
Second, because losing students has direct financial effects, public schools have an extra
incentive to adopt better programs and increase performance (Hoxby, 2003). Third,
public schools may change if charter schools influence the student composition of public
schools by absorbing more disadvantaged or problematic students (Vanourek, Manno,
Finn, & Bierlein, 2000) or by attracting the best and brightest students (Wells, Holme,
Lopez, & Cooper, 2000).
This research provides an empirical account of changes in outcomes in traditional
public schools in four states that experienced competition from charter schools in 1995 to
2001. I use a difference-in-differences design to compare the pre-charter legislation and
post-charter legislation trends in public schools, focusing on the following questions.
1) How do charter schools affect the racial, ethnic and socio-economic distribution of the
traditional public schools? 2) How do charter schools affect the resource levels of
traditional public schools? 3) How do charter schools affect the performance of
traditional public schools? 4) How do the size and scope of competitive effects vary
according to different formulations of competition?

10

Contributions of the Dissertation
Policy-makers need empirical data on which to base their decisions on charter
school reform. Charter schools’ effects are not limited to students who attend them.
Understanding the full-range of impacts created by charter schools is crucial to produce
sound and effective policies. Teske and Schneider (2001, p. 626) conclude their article
What Research Can Tell Policymakers about School Choice, where they review more
than a hundred papers on school choice, by pointing to the need for studies that link
stratification to specific forms of choice:
“…Better empirical data on the effects of choice on non-choosers and those left
behind are needed. This means that one of the most critical elements of choice
involves the degree to which choice stimulates competitive improvements in the
non-choice schools and the degree to which these gains are accompanied by more
or less stratification along race, SES, or other lines… (626)”
Previous research examining the systemic effects of charter schools is scarce,
mostly confined to a single outcome and a single measure of competition. This study
builds on the previous research, but uses a quasi-experimental approach based on panel
estimates and addresses multiple areas of potential impact using multiple measures of
competition. The two important advantages of panel data analyses are the ability to study
dynamic relationships and the ability to control for some omitted variables.
Empirical evaluation of competition has many methodological complications due
to selection problems (Goldhaber & Eide, 2003). In analysis with non-experimental data,
participation in the policy, program or treatment is not random. For example, at the
individual level, unobserved differences such as parental support may affect a student’s
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choice to attend a charter school as well as his performance. At the school level, a charter
school may specifically target a low-performing area to locate. The literature on the
systemic effects of charters on regular public schools has produced inconsistent findings.
Many factors such as the type of data, definition of the variables and the statistical
methods may affect findings about the charter schools’ effects. In order to deal with these
methodological problems, I use two strategies. First, I use multiple measures of charter
presence based on both enrollment and spatial position (via geocoding). I discuss these
measures in detail in the next chapter. Using multiple distance-based and enrollment
based measures allowed me to test the sensitivity of the changes in specifications.
Second, I use data from four different states, which allows me to observe different
contextual effects. Both difference-in-differences approach and the geo-coding of schools
are useful in teasing out the effects of the policy and providing a better understanding of
the size and scope of competitive effects.
Briefly, this dissertation provides a systematic and comprehensive evaluation of
the effects of charter schools on regular public schools. As the charter movement grows
and matures, the questions about changes in the racial and socioeconomic distribution of
students, pupil-teacher ratios and academic performance become increasingly critical.
The empirical evidence is not adequate to confirm the theoretical claims about the
potential segregation and resource draining effects of charter schools. The findings from
the current study investigate whether some of the concerns raised by critics of charter
schools have been realized.
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Overview of the Chapters
The rapid expansion of charter schools in Florida, New Jersey, Texas and Ohio in
the last six to eight years resembles a quasi-experiment that provides a valuable
opportunity to test the effects of charter school reform and to explore the research
questions posed in this study empirically. This dissertation is structured as follows.
In the next chapter, I will discuss my research methodology, data sources and
empirical measures. The variations in state laws also have direct implications for the
charter schools’ impact on the public education system. The laws have different
regulations concerning the number of charter school authorizers, caps on the number of
schools, and variety of applicants (CER, 2004). Such constraints may limit the potential
competitive pressures created by charter schools. I will briefly review some of the
variations in the charter laws and educational histories of the four states in the study
before the discussion of empirical results in the following chapters.
In chapters 3, 4 and 5, I present my results on the racial and ethnic distribution
and socio-economic segregation, student-teacher ratio, and academic outcomes
respectively. Each chapter will begin with a review of the relevant literature, and
followed by the empirical results. I will end the dissertation with a conclusion chapter,
which includes a summary of the primary findings and a discussion of the limitations,
conclusions, and possible extensions to the research.
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CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGY
I use a variation of the difference-in-differences (DD) estimation strategy to study
the effect of charter schools on my outcome measures. The difference-in-differences
estimator models a treatment effect by estimating the difference between outcome
measures at two time points for both the treated and the control observations and then
comparing the difference between the groups (Buckley & Shang, 2003; Card & Krueger,
1994).
The expansion of charter schools in Texas, Florida, New Jersey and Ohio in the
last six to eight years resembles a quasi-experiment that provides a valuable opportunity
to employ the research design. The study uses two-period school-level panel data for
these four states, which were selected from states that adopted charter school legislation
before 1998, that had no charter schools in 1995, and had more than 50 operational
charter schools in 2001. 2
Endogeneity is a common problem in this type of educational policy and program
evaluations that use observational data. The main problem stems from the fact that the
units of observation may not be randomly assigned to participate in the policy or program
in question. In the context of this study, changes in the proportion of white and free-lunch
eligible students, student-teacher ratios or test scores in nearby public schools may
actually represent pre-existing trends that are also driving the location of charter schools.
2

There are six states that satisfy these criteria: Florida, Texas, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania
and Ohio (PPSS, 2004). Four states in the study were selected to maximize diversity with regard to
geography, social and political context, and legislative variations. Each state is located in a different Census
region. Texas is in west south central division, Florida is in south Atlantic division, New Jersey is in middle
Atlantic division and Ohio is in east north central division. The legislation and the history of charter
schools in each state are discussed in the last section of this chapter.
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The difference-in-differences estimation method provides a simple and powerful
technique for estimating treatment effects with observational data (Buckley & Shang,
2003). As the models compare the difference between groups of schools, as well as the
difference of pre- and post-charter legislation measures, time-invariant factors that may
have affected both the outcome measures and charter school location are differenced out.
Although the DD method circumvents many of the endogeneity problems, the
method also has its limitations (Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2001; Meyer, 1995). A
main concern regarding validity is the potential endogeneity of the treatment. The model
treats the policy change as exogenous. This assumption may not be correct if policy
change is correlated with some unobserved determinants. Another maintained assumption
of the model is that of similar time effects across treated group and controls. This
assumption may not be realistic if other changes such as a change in economic conditions
influence groups differently. Aside from concerns regarding treatment, some researchers
also point out issues relating to the standard error of the estimate. DD estimates rely on
simple OLS regression and if there is severe correlation among outcomes, the estimated
standard errors can understate the standard deviations (seeBertrand, Duflo, &
Mullainathan, 2001 for a detailed discussion)
Despite its limitations, the difference-in-differences estimation strategy is used in
a number of studies that focus on the evaluation of policy impacts (Buckley & Shang,
2003; Card & Krueger, 1994; Dee & Fu, 2004; Hoxby, 2001; Ross, 2005).
Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan review ninety two papers using DD estimates
published in six journals between 1990 and 2000. (Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan,
2001). Other commonly used treatment effects strategies that aim to correct for selection
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bias include instrumental variables approach and propensity score matching. The
difference-in-differences model provides a straight forward estimation technique to study
treatment effects with observational data, especially when identifying appropriate
instrumental variables is difficult and matching leads to substantial loses in the number of
cases. The model used in this study differs from the traditional difference-in-differences
setup in some ways. In this study, I compare the outcome measures in public schools
facing charter school competition and other public schools, before and after the adoption
of charter school legislation in the state. The definition of the treatment condition is a key
concern in difference-in-differences estimates. Previous research utilizing variants of the
estimator generally use observations from some other control state (Card & Krueger,
1994; Dee & Fu, 2004). The selection of the control state is very important, as the model
assumes that the contemporaneous changes in the control state reflect the similar
unobserved and time-varying determinants of the treatment state. As there are many
variations in the charter laws and educational histories, as well as regional demographic
trends in different states, I employ a number of competition criteria within the same state
to assign schools to treatment and control groups. This ensures that both the treatment
and the control schools are affected similarly by unmeasured factors such as other
statewide policies. Because the states have very different contextual dynamics, analyses
are run separately for each state.
In some other respects, the design in the current study follows the traditional
difference-in-differences set-up. I use county level, spatial and enrollment-based
measures of charter exposure to group public schools and examine the changes between
pre- and post-charter legislation. While these measures cover several ways to measure the

16

charter school effect, they are dichotomous measures. I considered using continuous
measures of competition in the model to allow a different effect by the number of charter
school or to observe the marginal effects of increased enrollment; however, such a
modification would mean assuming a state effect for having any charter school and
concentrating on incremental changes. My main interest in this study is to examine the
aggregate effect over this period, not the incremental effects. In addition, the use of
multiple measures allows me to observe variation in the charter effect measured in
different ways. Therefore, I decide not to assume such a general state charter effect and
use the traditional two-way assignment. In the next section, I discuss these measures in
detail.

I begin the analysis by investigating the basic means estimates for groups of
schools during this period. In order to control for county level factors, I use a school and
year fixed effects regression model 3. The model takes on the following form:

Yit = β 0 + β1 X + β 2T + β 3 (T * C ) + ε it

where Yit is the dependent variable for school i in year t, T is a year dummy coded 1 for
observations in 2001-02 school year, X is a vector of control variables and C is the
competition measure. The parameter of interest is on the interaction term (T*C). The

3

The dependent variables are changes in outcome measures between 1995 and 2001. The fixed effects
regressions in the dissertation were estimated using the ‘areg, absorb’ command in Stata on data in the long
format. This is equivalent to adding a dummy for each school, but the value of each school coefficient is
not shown.
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coefficient

β

3

measures the changes unique to schools that face competition after the

introduction of charter schools. Figure 2.1 illustrates the general research design.
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Figure 2.1. Figural Model Outlining the Framework for the Study
1995
2001
BEFORE charter school effect
AFTER charter school effect

Data Sources
The data come from multiple sources. The primary data is school-level two-period
panel data on public schools in Texas, Florida, New Jersey and Ohio, drawn from the
Common Core Data (CCD) for the 1995-96 and 2001-02 school years (DOE, 2002). The
CCD is the Department of Education's primary database on public elementary and
secondary education in the United States. Five annual surveys are sent to state education
departments. State education agencies compile the requested data from their
administrative records and send the records to the National Center of Education Statistics
(NCES). The five surveys cover public school universe, local education agency (school
district) universe, state aggregate fiscal and non-fiscal data and school district fiscal data.
The school-level data include information on school location and type, enrollment, grades
served, student characteristics and the number of classroom teachers.
Table 1 summarizes the information on the number of public and charter schools
and charter school legislation in these states, and the number of schools included in the
study. The first data period represents the last year before any charter schools were
established and the second data period is the data from the recent post-treatment
environment that can be matched with current county-level data. After I extracted all the
schools from each state for pre- and post-legislation periods, I eliminated charter, special,
vocational, and other alternative schools. I also reviewed the names of the schools and
highest grade served. The schools whose name contained the following character strings
are also eliminated from the analyses: juvenile, detention, det., evening, program, center,
office, hospital, homebound, teleteaching, special, headstart, deaf, blind, kindergarten and
early childhood. Then, I deleted the schools that were not operational for both years, as
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they cannot be used for panel estimates. This reduced the sample size slightly to 5775
regular schools that were operational in both periods in Texas, 2248 schools in Florida,
2086 schools in New Jersey and 3457 schools in Ohio. 4 See table 1 for number of all
schools and number of schools included in the study.

Table 2.1 Summary Information for the States: School Year 2001-02
State

Number of
public
elementary
and
secondary
schools

United States

84,919

Number
of
charter
schools

Percentage
of
Students
in Charter
Schools
2,348

Number of
schools in
the study

Year Law
Passed

1.2

Florida
2,992
192
1.6
2,248
1996
Ohio
3,700
85
1.2
3,457
1997
New Jersey
2,271
51
0.9
2,086
1996
Texas
6,715
243
1.1
5,775
1995
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data
(CCD), "Public Elementary/Secondary School Universe Survey," 2001–02.

Outcome Measures
The outcome measures for this analysis cover three areas: racial, ethnic and socioeconomic composition of public school students, the student-teacher ratio in the public
schools and academic performance of public schools.
The first dependent variable is the percentage of students who are non-Hispanic
white. I used percentage of non-Hispanic White students as the outcome variable to track
the changes in the concentration of minority and non-Hispanic white students. This is a
commonly used and reported education indicator, also featured in the Department of

4

Most schools excluded from the analyses include non-traditional schools like kindergartens, juvenile
facilities and facilities for special populations like the deaf or the blind. As such, they were more likely to
serve non-traditional grade levels.
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Education’s publications as an important indicator of the condition of education in the
United States (Wirt et al., 2005).
The second dependent variable is the percentage of students who are eligible for
free lunch 5. Eligibility for the free lunch program provides a proxy measure of lowincome family status. It is a commonly used and reported education indicator. Previous
research found an association between higher percentages of students who are eligible for
free or reduced-price lunch and lower average academic scores in schools (NAEP, 2004).
The third dependent variable is the student-teacher ratio. Student-teacher ratio is
used to measure the level of human resources input in terms of number of teachers in
relation to the size of the student population and thus student-teacher ratio is both an
indicator of class size and resource levels of schools (NCES, 2005). These three outcome
measures are available in the Common Core Data.
In chapter 5, I discuss academic outcomes. I used publicly available school-level
average test scores in Texas, Ohio and Florida to replicate the models used to analyze
student compositions and student-teacher ratio in the earlier chapters. Although test
scores are one of many aspects of quality, many researchers have used test scores as an
indicator of school quality and academic achievement. I have used several outcome
measures using the available data. The data for this section comes from state Departments
of Education of Texas, Ohio and Florida. For Texas, the dependent variables are overall
passrate and math pass rate for each school on the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills
(TAAS) test. For Ohio, four dependent variables used in the analyses are the percentage
that passed standardized statewide tests in math and reading at grade 4 and grade 10. The

5

Students who are eligible for reduced price-lunch are not included to make the outcome measure more
stringent.
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only publicly available school level data that covers 1995 to 2001 in Florida is the Florida
Writing Assessment program (FWAP), which is scored on a scale of 1 to 6. The
dependent variables for these models are the percentages of students who scored 4 or
above at grade 4 and 10 in the FWAP.
Control Variables
Many social and demographic characteristics are likely to influence the outcome
measures, such as the racial composition of the local population and levels of poverty.
To control for other county level factors that may cause changes in the dependent
variables in this period, the models include county-level economic and demographic
indicators based on theory and literature. Most demographic indicators are chosen to
reflect the changes in the school aged population. I have used data from Small Area
Income and Poverty Estimates of the U.S. Census Bureau (2006) and merged these
variables into the Common Core Data files. The school-level CCD files do not include
county identifiers, but I generate county identifiers by using the district-level CCD files
that include county identifiers. These controls are the log of real median household
income, the percentage of 5–17 year olds who are in poverty, the percentage of the 5–19
year old county population who are white non-Hispanics and the logarithmic
transformation of total county population.
Charter schools are alternatives to private schools as well as to other traditional
public schools. Changes in the size of the private school population may also be affect
outcome measures; therefore, I have also included the proportion of private school
enrollment per county as a control. In order to calculate what percentage of students
attend private schools within a county, I use the Private School Survey (PSS) data from
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1995-96 and 2001-02 school years. PSS data is collected by NCES and includes total
number of private schools, teachers, and students.
Measures of Competition
The geographic location of the charter schools is critical to understanding their
full effects on public schools. In the United States, most students attend schools that they
are assigned to on the basis of where they live (Henig & Sugarman, 1999). Although
many households choose their residence by considering school quality, location and
convenience are important factors in school choice (Henig & MacDonald, 2002). Kleitz
(2000) found that location is an important determinant of charter school selection by
parents, especially for minority and low-income households (Henig & MacDonald, 2002;
Kleitz, Weiher, K., & R., 2000). Buckley and Schneider (2002) study how parents search
for information on a website about charter schools in Washington DC and found that
most parents look at a map of the school, but very few actually examine information on
quality of teachers or academic achievement scores (Schneider & Buckley, 2002).
Although charter schools are open to students from outside the school district, the
transportation cost of switching to distant schools would be higher (Henig & MacDonald,
2002). Studies focusing on charter school competition use different enrollment-based and
spatial measures to characterize charter school effect. Some studies focusing on states
with considerable charter enrollment use percent of students enrolled in charter schools to
characterize charter presence (Booker, Gilpatric, Gronberg, & Jansen, 2004; Hoxby,
2001; Ross, 2005; Sass, 2006). Many recent studies focus on spatial measures either with
simple dummy variables indicating charter presence in the district, county or vicinity of
the public school or with a count measure (Bettinger, 2005; Bifulco & Ladd, 2006;
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Bohte, 2004; Eberts & Hollenbeck, 2002). Dee and Fu (2004) use an innovative
difference in differences design, comparing New Mexico and Arizona public schools. As
New Mexico did not have any charters during the study period, these observations acted
as controls and Arizona schools in post-charter legislation period acted as a measure of
competition. Table 2.2 provides summary information on the several measures used in
the previous studies that focus on the impact of charter schools on traditional public
schools.
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Table 2.2. Charter Competition measures used in the literature
State Authors
Competition measure
Studies focused on achievement outcomes
MI
Hoxby (2001, - dichotomous variable for 6 percent or more charter
AZ
2003)
school enrollment in the district
MI
Eberts &
- dichotomous variable for presence of a charter school
Hollenbeck
in the district
(2002)
MI
Bettinger
- number of schools within 5-mile radius of a public
(1999, 2005)
school
NC
Bifulco &
- 3 dichotomous variables based on distance (the
Ladd (2004)
school attended by the student is within 2.5 miles of a
charter school, between 2.5 and 5 miles of the nearest
charter school, and between 5 and 10 miles of the
nearest charter school)
- 3 dichotomous variables based on number of schools
(the school had one, two, or more than two charter
schools located within 5 miles)
NC
Holmes,
- the distance between the public school and the
DeSimone &
closest charter school
Rupp (2003,
2006)
TX
Bohte (2004)
- dichotomous variable for presence of a charter school
in the district
- number of charter schools in the district
TX
Booker,
- the percent of public school students in a district that
Gilpatric,
attend a charter school
Gronberg and - the sum of net flow of students in the current year
Jansen (2004) and all previous years.
FL
Sass (2006)
- presence of nearby charter schools
- the number of competing charter schools
- enrollment share of charter schools
Studies focused on racial and ethnic distribution
AR
Dee and Fu
-comparison of New Mexico schools to Arizona
(2004)
schools (As New Mexico did not have any charters
during the study period, these observations acted as
controls and Arizona schools in post-charter
legislation period acted as a measure of competition)
MI
Ross (2005)
- dichotomous variable for presence of single or
multiple charter school in the district
-dichotomous variables indicating that the charter
schools account for below or above 7 percent of
district enrollment
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Following the literature that points out the importance of location in school
choice, and the previous studies focusing on competition effects, I mostly rely on spatial
measures to evaluate whether schools face competition from charter schools. I
experimented with different criteria to assign schools to groups. In three specifications, I
count a school as facing competition if at least one, five or nine charter schools operated
in the same county and compare them with other schools. These specifications produced
similar results.
Because counties vary widely in size, the number of schools per county may not
reflect the actual competitive pressure some schools face. I add geographic variables to
group schools based on spatial proximity. Latitude and longitude of each school were
added to the CCD data starting with 2000-01 school years. The missing latitude and
longitude values in Texas are extracted from the geospatial school data from Texas
Education Agency (TEA, 2005). For missing values in other states, the geographic
coordinates are imputed by directly contacting the schools, confirming their geographic
location and geo-coding from the addresses. 6 I use a spatial equation to convert latitude
and longitude differences between public and charter schools into actual distances in
miles on the surface of the earth. 7 I use these distances to count the number of charter
schools within 5 and within 10 miles of each traditional public school. These two spatial
specifications produce similar results.

6

Tele Atlas' Eagle Geocoding Technology is used, For more information on this software, see
http://www.geocode.com.

7

The equation is used is as follows:
Distance = 180/p * (ACOS ((SIN(p/180*lat_1) * SIN(p/180*lat_2)) + (COS(p/180*lat_1) *
COS(p/180*lat_2) * COS(p/180*ABS(long_1 - long_2))))) * 69.11
;where lat_1, long_1 and lat_2, long_2 are the latitude and longitudes of two points. It is multiplied by
69.11, which is the approximate number of miles per degree on the earth.
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Although enrollments in charter schools still represent a minor portion of the total
county enrollment in these states, I also use the share of public school population enrolled
in charter schools as an alternative measure. I categorize the counties as high enrollment
and low/ no enrollment, based on the percentage of public school students that are
enrolled in charter schools in 2001. I used the median value enrollment share of counties
that at least had one charter school in 2001 to compare schools located in those counties
to others. 8
I report results from three competition specifications. The first treatment group
includes traditional public schools that have one or more charter schools in the same
county (3370 schools in Texas, 1982 schools in Florida, 1651 schools in New Jersey and
1729 schools in Ohio). The second treatment group includes traditional public schools
that have at least one charter school within their 5-mile radius (2687 schools in Texas,
1414 schools in Florida, 1154 schools in New Jersey and 1293 schools in Ohio). The
third treatment group includes traditional public schools that are located in counties
where charter schools enroll more than the median percentage of public students (1586
schools in Texas, 1110 schools in Florida, 783 schools in New Jersey and 976 schools in
Ohio). Table 2.3 provides a list of all variables used in the models and their descriptions.
Table 2.3 List and Description of All Variables used in Regression Models
8

Some studies of charter school competition use charter enrollment share as a measure of
competition (Sass, 2006; Ross, 2005; Booker et al. 2004; Hoxby, 2001). I dichotomize the enrollment share
to be able to assign schools to treatment and control schools. One possibility was to use the 6 percent
measure in Hoxby’s (2001) paper; however, at the county level proportions attending charter schools are
quite small. So, I relied on the above/below median enrollment measure that is used in Ross (2003).
Some of the previous studies focusing on private school competition also use Herfindahl Index
alongside private school enrollment to measure competition effects on educational outcomes of private
schools (Belfield & Levin, 2002; Borland & Howson, 1993; Henry & Gordon, 2003). The Herfindahl index
is the sum of the squares of per-unit enrollments over total enrollments, where the units are typically
schools within a market (e.g. district or county) (Borland and Howson 1993). The index has not been used
in the charter school context In this research, I use median charter school enrollment in the county to
classify schools into groups based on enrollment shares, following current charter school competition
literature.
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Variable
nhw
free
puptch
tagrsum
tmgrsum
omgr4
omgr10
orgr4
orgr10
egr44above
ngr44above
egr104above
ngr104above
t
comp1
comp4
comp10
C1
C2
C3
per519nhw
age517pov
ltotalpop
lincome
ppriv

Description
Proportion of students who are non-Hispanic white
Proportion of students who are eligible for free-lunch
Student-teacher ratio
TAAS (Texas Assessment of Academic Skills) All Tests % Passing
Sum of 3-8 & 10
TAAS Math % Passing Sum of 3-8 & 10
Math grade 4 percent passed on standardized statewide test
Math grade 10 percent passed on standardized statewide test
Reading grade 4 percent passed on standardized statewide test
Reading grade 10 percent passed on standardized statewide test
Expository test, scored 4 and above, grade 4
Narrative test, scored 4 and above, grade 4
Expository test, scored 4 and above, grade 10
Narrative test, scored 4 and above, grade 10
=1 if 2001; =0 if 1995
School has at least one charter school in the same county
School has at least one charter school within 5 mile radius
School in county with at or above median charter enrollment
t*comp1= Interaction term showing public schools that have one or
more charter schools in their host county
t*comp4= Interaction term showing public schools that have one or
more charter schools within their 5-mile radius
t*comp10= Interaction term showing public schools that are in
counties with at or above median charter enrollment
% white non-Hispanics in the 5–19 year old population
The percent of 5–17 year olds in poverty
Log of the total county population
Log of the county real median household income
Proportion of private school enrollment in the county

Program Design
The charter laws vary from state to state, reflecting the varying educational
histories and the power of different political and civil groups such as teacher unions.
Some of the provisions in state laws may have direct implications for the charter schools’
impact on the public education system. I will briefly review some of the variations in the
charter laws, focusing on the approval process, funding, operations, students, and
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teachers and discuss the educational histories of the four states briefly before presenting
the empirical results from the study.
Texas
The Texas Legislature passed legislation establishing state charter schools in
1995. According to earlier charter law scores published annually by the Center for
Education Reform (CER), charter law in Texas was ranked as the seventh most charterfriendly in the United States (as reported in Booker, Gilpatric, Gronberg, & Jansen, 2004)
and the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research ranked Texas ninth in terms of its
availability of charter school options as of 2001 (J. Greene, 2002). In the current reports,
Texas bumped down to 20th in the CER rankings. Texas has a cap on the number of
charter schools permitted (CER, 2007). One of the main requirements for the efficient
functioning markets is free entry, thus the cap may limit the market-like nature of the
education reform. Texas first allowed the creation of 20 open-enrollment charter schools.
By 1997, it increased this number to 100 open-enrollment charter schools and an
unlimited number of open-enrollment charter schools serving students at risk of failure or
dropping out of school. If a school enrolled 75 percent or more at-risk students, it would
qualify as a 75 Percent Rule charter school and not be subject to the cap. This provision
was eliminated in 2001, and the State Board of Education increased the cap to 215
schools, also allowing for an unlimited number of specialized charter schools sponsored
by public senior colleges and universities (Shapley, Huntsberger, Maloney, & Sheehan,
2003). The at-risk provision provided an incentive for opening schools serving at-risk
populations and the majority of the new charter schools which opened in academic years
1996 to 2000 were of the at-risk type (Booker, Gilpatric, Gronberg, & Jansen, 2004).
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Overall, the number of schools increased rapidly after the adoption of the law. Table 2.4
shows the number of charter schools opened and students served each year.
Table 2.4 Number of Texas Open-Enrollment Charter Schools and Students Served,
1996-2002
School Year
Number of
Number of 75% Number of
Percent of
Charter
Rule Charters
Students
Public School
Schools
Students
1995-96
0
0
0
1996-97
17
0
2,498
0.06 %
1997-98
19
0
4,135
0.10 %
1998-99
89
45
17,616
0.31 %
1999-00
146
46
25,687
0.64 %
2000-01
160
51
37,696
0.93 %
2001-02
180
0
46,304
1.13 %
Source: TEA 2002 Snapshot. Open-enrollment evaluation reports, years one to five (www.tcer.org) and
Booker, Gilpatric, Gronberg and Jansen (2004)

Charter schools in Texas are spatially concentrated, 41 of 254 counties have no
charter school by 2001. Only the state board of education can authorize start-up charter
schools in Texas. The variation in funding and fiscal autonomy is also very critical to the
competition argument. Booker et al. (2004, p. 4) indicates that prior to 2001, according to
the Texas school financing rules, the cost of losing a student to a charter were larger in
Texas than other charter friendly states like Michigan or Arizona.
After interviewing a group of public school district officials for their 6th year
evaluation, evaluators of the Texas charter school program reported that 63 percent of
respondents reported having lost students to charter schools and more than half reported
that charter schools affected their districts financially (Shapley, Huntsberger, Maloney, &
Sheehan, 2003). Respondents estimated losing approximately $1.2 million in average
daily attendance (ADA) funding and $108,000 in federal funding due to charter schools.
Table 2.4 summarizes selected charter policy characteristics in Texas.
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Table 2.5 Selected State Policy Characteristics: Texas
General Statistics
215, not including schools started by public
universities

Number of Schools Allowed
Number of Charters Operating
(As of November 2005)
259
Charter Law Ranking (as of 2005 by CER)
20th
Ranking by Availability of Charter School
Options (as of 2001 by Greene, 2002)
9th
Approval Process
BOTH YES AND NO Local school boards for
conversions and state board of education for
Multiple Authorizers
open-enrollments (new starts)
For conversion charters, parents and teachers at
existing public schools; for open-enrollment
charters, existing public or private schools,
parents, teachers, public or private institutions
of higher education, non-profit organizations,
governmental entities
Eligible Applicants
Types of Charter Schools
Both converted and new starts
Private school conversion
Allowed
Term of Initial Charter
Specified in charter, usually 5 years
Operations
Charters may not be granted directly to forCharter School May be Managed or Operated
profit organizations, but the schools may
by a For-Profit Organization
contract with them for services.
Transportation for Students
Not required
Funding
State funds are guaranteed; local revenue is
determined based on statewide averages.
Estimated portion is about $7,300.
Funding amount
Funds pass through districts to charter schools
authorized by local school boards; from state to
Funding path
open-enrollment charter schools.
Fiscal autonomy
Limited
Start-up funds
Federal funds available, no state funding
Students
Restrictions for enrollment
Students in geographic area specified in charter
Enrollment Requirements
None
Teachers
Teachers at conversions remain part of district;
Collective Bargaining / District Work Rules
teachers at open-enrollments work
independently
Certification
Not required
SOURCES: adopted from The Center for Education Reform, State by state charter law profiles
<http://www.edreform.com>, National Center for Education Statistics’ State Education Reforms (SER)
web site <http://nces.ed.gov/programs/statereform/sssco_tab.asp>, US Charter Schools Web site
<http://www.uscharterschools.org> and Texas State Department of Education.
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Florida
The first five charter schools in Florida opened during the 1996-97 school year.
Florida was ranked as 9th strongest of the nation’s 41 charter laws by the Center of
Education Reform and 4th by the availability of charter school options by the Manhattan
Institute index. Because of this supportive charter law environment, Florida had the third
highest number of charter schools in the nation, with 333 charter schools by 2005
(FDOE, 2005). Table 2.5 shows the increase in the number of charter schools and
students served since the adoption of the charter law.
Table 2.6 Number of Florida Open-Enrollment Charter Schools and Students Served,
1996-2002
Number of
Percent of
School Year
Number of
Students
Public School
Charter
Schools
Students
1995-96
0
0
1996-97
5
400
0.02%
1997-98
31
3,500
0.15%
1998-99
78
10,000
0.43%
1999-00
113
17,200
0.72%
2000-01
148
27,200
1.12%
2001-02
190
39,900
1.60%
Source: adopted from Sass (2006)

Charter schools are spatially concentrated in Florida. In 2000, charter schools
operated in 33 of Florida’s 67 school districts (Allendorff, Brand, & Frederick, 2000). By
2005, still nearly half of the charter schools and about half of the state’s charter school
students were located in the state’s five largest school districts (B. Hassel, Terrell, &
Kowal, 2006).
In Florida, local school boards authorize charters and any non-profit can apply for
a charter. Although charters may not be granted directly to for-profit organizations, they
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can manage the schools (CER, 2004). In Florida, for-profit groups (educational
management organizations) manage more than a quarter of charter schools (B. Hassel,
Terrell, & Kowal, 2006). Alongside charters managed by independent boards and EMOs,
Florida also has municipality-run charter schools and charter schools in the workplace.
Most state charter laws prevent charter schools to employ selective enrollment. Florida is
the first state to pass legislation allowing businesses to open charter schools in their
facility that target employee’s children.
Initially, there were varying caps on the number of charter schools by district
enrollment, but the caps were increased gradually and totally eliminated in 2003 (B.
Hassel, Terrell, & Kowal, 2006). The Florida charter legislation also states that the
racial/ethnic balance of charter school may not differ from the district or community.
Transportation for students is encouraged but not required, however, the law also states
that transportation must not be a barrier to equal access (CER, 2005). The law does not
provide guidelines on enforcement of this rule.
Charter schools are exempt from all statutes of the Florida School Code, but are
bound by the rules in their charter and some other laws. They are also under the oversight
of the district (Allendorff, Brand, & Frederick, 2000). Most charter school administrators
interviewed for the Florida Office of Program and Policy Analysis report were not aware
of the possibility of requesting additional flexibility by asking the district school board to
apply to the Commissioner of Education to get waivers for certain rules and codes
(Allendorff, Brand, & Frederick, 2000, p. 13).
Funds pass from district to school and the district may hold up to 5% of the
funding for administrative services. Florida legislation also has alternative means for
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Table 2.7 Selected State Policy Characteristics: Florida
General Statistics
Number of Schools Allowed
Unlimited
Number of Charters Operating
(As of November 2005)
326
Charter Law Ranking (as of 2005 by CER) 9th
Ranking by Availability of Charter School 4th
Options (as of 2001 by Greene, 2002)
Approval Process
YES (Local school boards; a district school board may
Multiple Authorizers
Eligible Applicants
Types of Charter Schools
Private school conversion
Term of Initial Charter

sponsor a charter school in the county over which the
board has jurisdiction )
Any non-profit entity
Both converted and new starts
Allowed
3,4, or 5 years with renewal every 5 years. Non-profits
are eligible for up to a 10 year charter, and charters
operating for 3 years that have demonstrated success can
renew for a 15-year term to facilitate financing.

Operations
Charter School May be Managed or
Operated by a For-Profit Organization
Transportation for Student
Funding amount

Funding path
Fiscal autonomy
Start-up funds
Restrictions for enrollment
Enrollment Requirements

Yes
Not required

Funding
100% of state and district operations funding
follows students, based on average district perpupil revenue fees for administrative services may
not exceed 5% of total funding. Estimated portion
is about $6,936.
Funds pass through district to school
Yes
Federal and state funds available
Students
School can limit enrollment to students at-risk of
dropping out or academic failure and to students within
certain boundaries.
Students enrolled prior, siblings, and the children of
employees. Charter schools may give preference for
enrollment to at-risk students. Also, racial/ethnic balance
of charter school may not differ from district or
community

Teachers
Teachers may remain covered by district bargaining
agreement, negotiate as a separate unit with the
governing body, or work independently
Required, with waivers in specific but narrow
Certification
circumstances
SOURCES: adopted from The Center for Education Reform, State by state charter law profiles
<http://www.edreform.com>, National Center for Education Statistics’ State Education Reforms (SER)
web site <http://nces.ed.gov/programs/statereform/sssco_tab.asp>, US Charter Schools Web site
<http://www.uscharterschools.org> and Florida State Department of Education.

Collective Bargaining / District Work
Rules
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providing additional support for charter schools including capital outlay funding or tax
exemptions for charter facilities. Table 2.6 summarizes selected charter policy
characteristics in Florida.
New Jersey
New Jersey legislature signed the nation’s twentieth charter law in 1995, first
allowing 135 charter schools to be established in four years. The cap is eliminated in
2000. Following the New Jersey Charter School Program Act of 1995, the first 13 charter
schools opened their doors for the 1997-1998 school years. By the 2001-2002 school
year, 54 charter schools were serving over 10,000 students in the State of New Jersey
(CER, 2005). Table 2.7 provide information on the number of charter schools and
students.
Table 2.8 Number of New Jersey Open-Enrollment Charter Schools and Students Served,
1996-2002
School Year
Number of
Number of
Percent of
Charter
Students
Public School
Schools
Students
1995-96
0
0
1996-97
0
0
1997-98
13
1998-99
34
1999-00
47
2000-01
53
~13,000
0.8
2001-02
51
~14,000
0.9
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data
(CCD), "Public Elementary/Secondary School Universe Survey" .
- Data is missing. 1998-99 was the first school year in which states were asked to "flag" charter schools in
their reports to CCD.

Similar to Florida, charters cannot be granted directly to for-profit organizations
by law, but they can manage the schools. By 2001, only seven schools were managed by
for-profit organizations in New Jersey. New Jersey charter schools differ from charter
schools in other states in two other ways. Unlike other states in the study, districts
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provide transportation for students and none of New Jersey's charter schools are
converted from other public schools; they are all start-ups (NJDOE, 2005).
Charter schools in New Jersey created controversy, especially at the beginning. Some
local school boards filed appeals with the state board of education to overturn the charters
and some even appealed the the constitutionality of the charter law ("NJ Charter School
Resource Center: History of NJ Charter Schools", 2006). One of the main issues was
financing. The evaluators of New Jersey charter school program have interviewed a
group of district officials that host charters in their districts (KPMG, 2001). The majority
stated that the most prevalent impact of the charters was on their budgets. More than half
believed charter schools had stimulated competition among schools, but only a couple
reported making program changes to compete with charter schools.
While district officials complain about the resource drain, National Alliance for
Public Charter Schools argues that charter schools in New Jersey suffer from inequities in
funding. The school districts provide 90% of the lesser of the state and district operations
funding to charters and charters do not have access to state revenue payments or local
capital revenue that are available to other schools through New Jersey's Public School
Construction Act (NACS, 2006). Selected characteristics of charter school policy in New
Jersey is listed under table 2.8.
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Table 2.9 Selected State Policy Characteristics: New Jersey
General Statistics
Number of Schools Allowed
Unlimited
Number of Charters Operating
(As of November 2005)
52
Charter Law Ranking (as of 2005 by CER)
20th
Ranking by Availability of Charter School Options
14th
(as of 2001 by Greene, 2002)
Approval Process
Multiple Authorizers
No, only State commissioner of education
Eligible Applicants
Teachers and/or parents in district;
college/university or
private entity in conjunction with teachers/parents
Types of Charter Schools
New starts
Private school conversion
Allowed
Term of Initial Charter
4 years
Operations
Charter School May be Managed or Operated by a
Charters may not be granted directly to for-profit
For-Profit Organization
organizations, but the schools may be managed by
them
Transportation for Students
Provided by district
Funding
Funding amount
90% of the lesser a) state and district operations
funding based on average district per-pupil revenue
or b) state mandated minimum per-pupil spending.
District also pays categorical aid. Estimated portion
is about $8,953.
Funding path
Funds pass through district to school
Fiscal autonomy
Yes
Start-up funds
Federal funds available; no state funding
Students
Restrictions for enrollment
Charter school may not base enrollment on
academic achievement or ability
Enrollment Requirements
All students in state
Teachers
Collective Bargaining / District Work Rules
Teachers in conversions remain covered by district
collective bargaining agreement; teachers in new
starts may negotiate as a separate unit with the
governing body, or work independently
Certification
Required
SOURCES: adopted from The Center for Education Reform, State by state charter law profiles
<http://www.edreform.com>, National Center for Education Statistics’ State Education Reforms (SER)
web site <http://nces.ed.gov/programs/statereform/sssco_tab.asp>, US Charter Schools Web site
<http://www.uscharterschools.org> and New Jersey State Department of Education.
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Ohio
Charter schools are known as community schools in Ohio. The pilot community
school program started in June of 1997, expanded to 85 schools in 2001 and 277 schools
in 2005. The number of students attending charter schools has also steadily increased
every year since their inception. Table 2.9 illustrates the growth in the number of Ohio
community schools and students. The ongoing growth accelerated in the recent years. By
2005, charter school student enrollment represent about 2.5 percent of total public school
enrollment in Ohio, more than a hundred percent increase from the 2001 figure.
According to Legislative Office of Education Oversight report, the number of charter
schools in Ohio has grown 800% since 1998 (Panizo, Cherry, DeJacimo, & Rowland,
2003, p. 1).
Table 2.10 Number of Ohio Open-Enrollment Charter Schools and Students Served,
1996-2002
School Year
Number of
Number of
Percent of
Charter
Students
Public School
Schools
Students
1995-96
0
0
1996-97
0
0
1997-98
0
0
1998-99
15
2,245
0.1
1999-00
48
9,032
0.5
2000-01
68
16,717
0.8
2001-02
93
22,850
1.2
Source: adopted from Russo (2005) and Ohio Department of Education; U.S. Department of Education,
National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Public Elementary/Secondary
School Universe Survey"

Any individual or group can start a charter school in Ohio (CER, 2005). As a
result, non and for-profit educational management organizations are very active in the
Ohio charter school market (CER, 2005). The legislation initially put a cap of 225 on
start-up charter schools located in the biggest eight districts and no limit on conversion
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schools. Like other states, charter enrollment is spatially concentrated in the eight urban
school districts. Akron, Canton, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, Toledo and
Youngstown , account for more than two-thirds of the state’s charter school enrollment.
(Jewell, 2005).
Ohio's charter school movement has created much controversy and has come
under heavy criticism in the media. From the beginning, there was a strong opposition to
charter schools by teacher unions, some local districts and legislators. To date, two
lawsuits by the Ohio Federation of Teachers and one federal lawsuit by the Ohio
Education Association have attempted to stop charter schools in the state (Russo, 2005).
Despite their small enrollment share, charter schools have large financial effects on
school districts. Jewell (2004) shows that funding levels have grown from $11 million to
$290 million from 1998 to 2003. Panizo, Cherry, DeJacimo and Rowland (2003, p. 94)
estimate that Dayton, Cincinnati, and Youngstown school districts have lost between
13% and 21% of their state funding to charter schools in 2002. There is a disagreement
over the funding formula of charter schools. The Center for education reform asserts that
100% of the funds are passed from state to the school. Some like Jewel (2004, p.8-9)
argue that state’s funding formula also effect local funds and even if it does not, state
funding for charter school students is higher than comparable traditional school funding.
Others like Russo (2005, p.24) argues that charter school funding is significantly less
than what traditional public schools receive and they don’t have access to local funds.
Table 2.11 presents selected Ohio Charter policy characteristics.
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Table 2.11 Selected State Policy Characteristics: Ohio
Number of Schools Allowed
Number of Charters Operating
(As of November 2005)
Charter Law Ranking (as of 2005 by
CER)
Ranking by Availability of Charter
School Options (as of 2001 by Greene,
2002)

General Statistics
Cap of 225 for start-ups located in Big Eight Districts,
Unlimited for conversions
277
18th
12th

Approval Process
YES (local school boards; boards of joint vocational school
districts; boards of educational service centers; state
universities, as approved by the state department of education;
federally tax-exempt entities, as approved by the state
department of education; or, when another authorizer fails to
comply with its obligation as a sponsor, the state
department of education..)
Eligible Applicants
Any individual or group
Types of Charter Schools
Converted and new
Private school conversion
No information
Term of Initial Charter
Up to 5 years
Operations
Charter School May be Managed or
Charters may not be granted directly to for-profit
Operated by a For-Profit Organization
organizations, but the schools may be managed by them
Transportation for Students
The district in which community school students are eligible to
attend, school must provide transportation to and from a
community school located within the district or within another
district, but districts are not required to provide transportation if
student lives more than 30 minutes away from school.
Funding
Funding amount
100% of the funds equal to the community school’s base
formula amount, as adjusted by the cost-of-doing business
factor of the school district in which the student is entitled to
attend school. Estimated portion is about $5,629.
Funding path
Funds pass from state to school
Fiscal autonomy
Yes
Start-up funds
Federal funds available; no state funding
Students
Restrictions for enrollment
School may choose to limit enrollment to students in a
particular geographic area or to at-risk students; school must
enroll at least 25 students
Enrollment Requirements
All students in state
Teachers
Collective Bargaining / District Work
Teachers in conversions remain part of district collective
Rules
bargaining agreement, unless a majority of them petition to
organize as a separate unit, or work independently; charter
school teachers in new starts may work independently or form a
separate bargaining unit
Certification
Required, but law allows for alternative certification; uncertified
employees may teach up to 12 hours/week
SOURCES: adopted from The Center for Education Reform, State by state charter law profiles
<http://www.edreform.com>, US Charter Schools Web site <http://www.uscharterschools.org> and Florida
State Department of Education.
Multiple Authorizers
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Summary Discussion
The review of the above-mentioned information is important to understand the
context in which the charter legislation is adopted and the schools are operating. The
provisions in state charter school laws affect the flexibility and autonomy of the schools.
The legislation alongside other historical factors in the state also reflect the amount of
support for charter schools. Shober, Manna and Witte (2006) analyzed the content of
charter school laws in all states to investigate how different laws affect the formation of
charter schools. The authors argue that different laws reflect different values that affect
charter openings. Flexibility and accountability, two inherent characteristics of charter
schools, may sometimes function against each other. The laws and regulations in each
state reflect the need for balance between accountability to public agencies and flexibility
required for responding to parental demand.
Despite variations, all state laws include elements of accountability and
flexibility. For this research, some of these elements are especially important, because the
legislation directly affects the structure of the educational market in the state. For
example, Texas and Ohio have caps on the number of charter schools allowed, as
opposed to Florida and New Jersey, which allow for unlimited number of schools. In
New Jersey only the state board and in Florida only local school boards authorize
charters, while in Ohio state universities, the state board, and the local boards may
authorize charter schools. Such exogenous constraints limit the degree to which charter
reform can foster market-like environments that induce competition. Previous research
has shown that states with multiple charter authorizers that do not have caps on the
number of schools create more charter-friendly environments.
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It is also very important to consider unique provisions in some state laws. The 75
Percent Rule in Texas provides an illustrative example. It could be misleading to reach
conclusions about changes in student distributions in public schools without considering
the incentives created by this rule on new charter schools to target at risk students.
Shober, Manna and Witte (2006) also argue that local political context is critical in
explaining charter openings. The educational histories discussed in the preceding section
show that the charter schools in Ohio were strongly opposed by local institutions such as
teacher unions, local districts, legislators and media from the beginning. This opposition
most likely affects the education market in the state and it may also be an indication of
stronger impacts of charter schools on traditional public schools. Other factors like
inclusion of non-profits as eligible applicants may change the participants of the charter
industry in the state. The collective bargaining, district work arrangements, and
certification rules may affect the ability of charters to attract high quality teachers. The
transportation requirements and enrollment restrictions have direct implications for the
student body served by the charter schools. Therefore, these contextual differences may
provide us with valuable insights to better understand some of the changes in the outcome
measures.
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CHAPTER 3
EFFECTS ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION AND
SOCIO-ECONOMIC SEGREGATION
In the last decade, most states have adopted charter school legislation, with the
familiar hopes of increasing the efficiency of schools and creating competition in public
education. Charter school authorizers in the recent US Department of Education report on
charter schools cited creating competition in the public school system as the primary
reason they awarded charters (PPSS, 2004). The question of whether school choice will
help reduce or reinforce existing segregation in the public school system has been long
debated. Some scholars argue that charter schools might actually reduce existing
stratification, particularly in locations where conventional public schools are highly
segregated, by either reducing middle class parents’ willingness to move to the suburbs or
to send their children to private schools or by empowering disadvantaged parents to
choose schools without residential limitations (Greene, 2000; Hassel, 1999). However,
the concerns regarding potential segregation by race and class remains (Bulkley & Fisler,
2003; Fuller, 2000; Wamba & Ascher, 2003).
Because of the ongoing growth of charter schools, concerns about segregation and
stratification will become increasingly important. Has the introduction of charter schools
affected the racial and socio-economic composition of public schools in the United
States? This chapter explores the systemic effects of charter schools on the racial and
socio-economic composition of public schools by addressing the following questions: 1)
How does the presence of charter schools affect the racial and socio-economic
distribution of students in traditional public schools? 2) How do the size and scope of
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effects vary according to different measures of exposure? I summarize the related
literature in the next section, before presenting the empirical results.
Previous Research
Most public schools in the United States are already highly segregated by race
and socioeconomic status (Clotfelter, 1999; Frankenberg, Lee, & Orfield, 2003). The
effect of choice policies on segregation and stratification is a critical issue. Schools in
other countries that have experienced wide-ranging school choice reforms have become
significantly more polarized along ethnic and socioeconomic lines (Ladd & Fiske, 2001;
Schneider, Elacqua, & Buckley, 2006).
Charter schools may increase segregation in a variety of ways (Fiske & Ladd,
2000; Schneider, Elacqua, & Buckley, 2006; Smith & Meier, 1995; Wells, Holme,
Lopez, & Cooper, 2000). First, parents choose schools for a variety of reasons, including
peer group preferences and geographical proximity. If parents value certain peer group
characteristics and sort their children into schools along racial and class lines, existing
stratification may deepen (Smith & Meier, 1995). Although most surveys of parents show
that all parents value academic quality and that few refer to the composition of the
student body in schools, studies based on actual behavior of parents found that parental
decisions do appear to be influenced by other factors such as demographics or values
(Henig, 1990; Schneider & Buckley, 2002; Schneider, Elacqua, & Buckley, 2006;
Schneider, Marschall, Teske, & Roch, 1998; Weiher & Tedin, 2002). Another aspect
regarding parental demand is the ability of parents to make well-informed decisions.
Parents differ in their ability to obtain and process information about schools. Research
on other forms of public school choice has clearly demonstrated that there are significant
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information disparities between different groups of parents and that the average parent
does not have very accurate information about the conditions in schools (Schneider,
Teske, & Marschall, 2000; Schneider, Teske, Marschall, & Roch, 1998). Low-income
and less-educated parents are more likely to lack the necessary resources to make
informed decisions and to be in lower quality and isolated education networks
(Schneider, Teske, Roch, & Marschall, 1997).
Second, even in states set racial/ethnic balance enrollment guidelines for their
charter schools, schools can influence their student distributions through a variety of
mechanisms (Wamba & Ascher, 2003). The viability of charter schools depends on their
capacity to attract students, who increase their financial resources more then their costs.
Critics worry that the financial and academic pressures may give them an incentive to
avoid high-cost students (Miron & Nelson, 2002). Charter schools can shape their
recruitment and admission policies to affect the profile of applicants (Wamba & Ascher,
2003). They can target certain types of parents through advertisements, flyers, mailers
and presentations (Wells, 2002). They can also focus their curricula to attract students
from particular backgrounds. Even the “first come, first served” rule can create
disadvantages for students with less information (Wells, 2002). Requiring parents to
provide transportation may seriously affect the pool of applicants (Wells, Holme, Lopez,
& Cooper, 2000). Keeping these concerns in mind, critics warn that existing stratification
and segregation may deepen as choice increases, if the necessary institutional
arrangements and regulations are not created (Cobb & Glass, 1999; Schneider, Elacqua,
& Buckley, 2006; Smith & Meier, 1995; Wells, Holme, Lopez, & Cooper, 2000)
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In this section, I will briefly review the empirical studies that focus on the effects
of charter schools on student compositions. Much of the existing research on student
compositions in charter schools is cross-sectional comparisons of whom the schools are
serving (see e.g. C. Finn, Manno, & Vanourek, 2000; Frankenberg & Lee, 2003a; Nelson
et al., 2000). In the National Study of Charter Schools sponsored by the U.S. Department
of Education, Nelson et al. (2000) conclude that the proportion of white students in
charter and public schools are about the same, providing no evidence of increased
segregation. On the other hand, in the Charter Schools and Race study sponsored by the
Harvard Civil Rights Project, Frankenberg and Lee (2003b) compare racial composition
and segregation of charter schools by state and conclude that charter schools are largely
more segregated than public schools in the same state.
Other studies, primarily focusing on the academic performance, examined
whether charter schools absorb more advantaged students from public schools and
worsen school systems for troubled students, which is sometimes referred to as an
academic skimming problem. Hoxby (2003) finds that the students with lower grades and
minority students transferred to charter schools in Chicago, suggesting no skimming on
an academic or racial basis. Hanushek, Rivkin and Kain (2002) in Texas and Bifulco and
Ladd (2004; 2006) in North Carolina use student level data that enabled them to track the
moves of students from a regular public school to a charter school or back over time.
Both studies find that the charters cause additional racial and ethnic concentration,
primarily because black charter school students select into more racially isolated schools.
Three studies used variations of the difference-in-differences estimates, which is
also utilized in this paper, to study the effect of charter schools on student composition of
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public schools. As discussed in the methodology chapter, the basic idea behind the
difference-in-differences estimator is to model the treatment effect by estimating the
difference between outcome measures at two time points for both the treated and the
control observations and then comparing the difference between the groups (Buckley &
Shang, 2003; Card & Krueger, 1994). The definition of the treatment condition is a key
concern in difference-in-differences estimates. Hoxby (2001) in her study of the effects
of charter schools on the achievement of public school students in Arizona and Michigan,
defines “treatment” school districts as those where charter schools account for over 6
percent of district enrollment, based on average annual enrollment change in a Michigan
school (which was 5.1 percents prior to 1994). She found that both the Michigan and
Arizona public schools raised achievement in the face of competition from charter
schools and the increased achievement was not a result of cream-skimming of students.
Dee and Fu (2004) compare changes in the student-teacher ratio and share of white
students in Arizona, which introduced charter schools, and New Mexico, which did not.
They found that charter schools drew white non-Hispanic students from regular public
schools and caused a reduction of resources in Arizona. The underlying assumption is
that the average district in Arizona faced a non-zero charter school presence. Even though
some counties and school districts in Arizona host multiple charter schools, some do not
host any. As the competitive impact of charter schools should be stronger in their host
school districts or counties, the potential competitive effect of charter schools may differ
between these two types of districts and the actual charter school effects may even be
larger. In a district level analysis, Ross (2005) estimates the effect of charter school
presence on the segregation of traditional public schools within districts in Michigan. She
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measures charter presence with three dichotomous variables indicating existence of a
single charter school within the district, existence of multiple charter schools within the
district, and indicating the charter schools account for below or above 7 percent of district
enrollment (median enrollment rate in Michigan in 1999). Her results show that quantity
of charter schools do not affect segregation, but several forms of public school
segregation (black and Latino exposure to white students) have been exacerbated in
Michigan districts with high levels of charter school enrollment.
Empirical Results
While the average changes in the composition of students served by public
schools can not capture the full extent of segregation or integration in schools, this
chapter focuses on the composition of student bodies as a first step in beginning to
understand whether the charter school movement contributes to how student groups are
sorted across schools. The two dependent variables for this analysis are the percentage of
students who are non-Hispanic white and the percentage of students who are eligible for
free lunches. In this section, I present the empirical findings from all four states for these
two outcome variables. In tables 3.1 to3.4, I report the means of the share of nonHispanic white students and free-lunch eligible students in these four states for groups of
schools. The first treatment group (C1) includes traditional public schools that have one
or more charter schools in the same county. The second treatment group (C2) includes
traditional public schools, which have at least one charter school within their 5-mile
radius. The third treatment group (C3) includes traditional public schools, which are
located in counties where charter schools enroll more than the median percentage of
public students.
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Table 3.1 Mean Differences in the Share of non-Hispanic White Students and Free-lunch
eligible students for Traditional Public Schools in Texas*
% non-Hispanic white students
C1
C2
C3
1995-96
Treatment
42.1
36.1
36.6
2001-02
34.9
28.7
28.0
Difference
-7.2
-7.4
-8.6
1995-96
Control
62.9
63.5
56.1
2001-02
58.6
58.7
51.1
Difference
-4.3
-4.8
-5.0
Difference-in-Differences
-2.9
-2.6
-3.6
% Free-lunch eligible students
C1
C2
C3
1995-96
Treatment
44.2
47.3
46.8
2001-02
42.8
45.5
45.9
Difference
-1.4
-1.8
-0.9
1995-96
Control
37.6
36.3
39.4
2001-02
38.2
36.9
39.1
Difference
0.6
0.6
-0.3
Difference-in-Differences
-2.0
-2.4
-0.6
* C1 refers to the county level measure (Public schools that have one or more charter schools in their host
county); C2 refers to the spatial measure (Public schools that have one or more charter schools within their
5-mils radius); C3 refers to the enrollment measure (Public schools that are in counties with above median
charter enrollment).

Table 3.2 Mean Differences in the Share of non-Hispanic White Students and Free-lunch
eligible students for Traditional Public Schools in Florida*
% non-Hispanic white students
C1
C2
C3
1995-96
56.9
Treatment
50.9
50.5
2001-02
50.5
44.4
44.0
Difference
-6.4
-6.5
-6.5
1995-96
Control
73.7
72.4
67.0
2001-02
71.1
67.5
61.7
Difference
-2.6
-4.9
-5.3
Difference-in-Differences
-3.8
-1.6
-1.2
% Free-lunch eligible students
C1
C2
C3
1995-96
Treatment
41.0
43.5
43.7
2001-02
42.4
45.5
45.2
Difference
1.4
2.0
1.5
1995-96
Control
40.2
36.5
38.2
2001-02
41.4
36.7
39.3
Difference
1.2
0.2
1.1
Difference-in-Differences
0.2
1.8
0.4
* C1 refers to the county level measure (Public schools that have one or more charter schools in their host
county); C2 refers to the spatial measure (Public schools that have one or more charter schools within their
5-mils radius); C3 refers to the enrollment measure (Public schools that are in counties with above median
charter enrollment).

50

Table 3.3 Mean Differences in the Share of non-Hispanic White Students and Free-lunch
eligible students for Traditional Public Schools in New Jersey*
% non-Hispanic white students
C1
C2
C3
1995-96
Treatment
62.3
55.0
51.5
2001-02
57.7
50.2
47.0
Difference
-4.6
-4.8
-4.5
1995-96
Control
80.7
80.0
74.9
2001-02
77.8
76.4
70.8
Difference
-.2.9
-3.6
-4.1
Difference-in-Differences
-1.7
-1.2
0.4
% Free-lunch eligible students
C1
C2
C3
1995-96
Treatment
24.3
29.4
35.4
2001-02
22.9
27.9
34.2
Difference
-1.4
-1.5
-1.2
1995-96
Control
18.4
15.3
15.6
2001-02
16.8
14.0
14.2
Difference
-1.6
-1.3
-1.4
Difference-in-Differences
0.2
-0.2
0.2
* C1 refers to the county level measure (Public schools that have one or more charter schools in their host
county); C2 refers to the spatial measure (Public schools that have one or more charter schools within their
5-mils radius); C3 refers to the enrollment measure (Public schools that are in counties with above median
charter enrollment).

Table 3.4 Mean Differences in the Share of non-Hispanic White Students and Free-lunch
eligible students for Traditional Public Schools in Ohio*
% non-Hispanic white students
C1
C2
C3
1995-96
Treatment
72.6
67.0
66.5
2001-02
68.6
62.8
62.4
Difference
-4.0
-4.2
-4.1
1995-96
Control
96.1
94.7
91.3
2001-02
95.7
93.7
89.9
Difference
-.0.4
-1.0
-1.4
Difference-in-Differences
-3.6
-3.2
-2.7
% Free-lunch eligible students
C1
C2
C3
1995-96
Treatment
14.8
17.4
14.8
2001-02
33.0
40.0
35.9
Difference
18.2
22.6
21.1
1995-96
Control
16.3
14.5
15.9
2001-02
21.7
19.8
24.1
Difference
5.4
5.3
8.2
Difference-in-Differences
12.8
17.3
12.9
* C1 refers to the county level measure (Public schools that have one or more charter schools in their host
county); C2 refers to the spatial measure (Public schools that have one or more charter schools within their
5-mils radius); C3 refers to the enrollment measure (Public schools that are in counties with above median
charter enrollment).
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The estimates show that the average share of non-Hispanic white students fell
more in traditional public schools that faced competition from charter schools in all four
states 1995-96 school year to 2001-02. The results show that there is also a decrease in
the share of non-Hispanic white students in other control schools, although the size of the
change is significantly smaller. This implies that the introduction of charter schools affect
this reduction, however charter schools may be located in counties with different racial
compositions in the first place. The difference-in-differences estimates control the
differences between the two groups before the implementation of the policy (Purdon,
Lessof & Bryson, 2001). Difference-in-differences column in the table shows the
difference of the differences between the two groups of schools. For example, proportion
of non-Hispanic white students in traditional public schools that are located in counties
with at least one charter school fell by .072 from 1995 to 2001. Proportion of nonHispanic white students in other traditional public schools also fell by .043 in the same
period. The difference between these differences shows that the introduction of charter
schools suggests a 2.9 percentage point decrease (-0.072 –(-0.043) ) in the share of nonHispanic white students in Texas traditional schools, which face charter competition in
their county. The estimates show a 3.8 percentage point decrease in Florida, 1.8
percentage point decrease in New Jersey and a 3.6 percentage point decrease in Ohio.
The enrollment measure produces very similar results. The spatial measure produces
similar, but slightly smaller results. The enrollment based measure shows a larger
negative effect in Texas, and similar but smaller effects in other states.
The differences in means for free-price lunch students show effects in different
directions across states. The difference between the differences from 1995 to 2001 show
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a drop of 2.0 percentage points with the county level measure, 2.4 percentage points with
the spatial measure, and 0.6 points with the enrollment based measure in Texas. In other
states, the differences of differences are almost all positive with the exception of New
Jersey public schools which have charter schools within their 5-mile radius. The
differences in differences are very small in New Jersey schools. In Florida and Ohio
schools, the means estimates shows that the share of free-lunch eligible students
increased in this period for both the treatment and control schools, but more for treatment
schools, suggesting that charter schools contribute to the rise in the share of free lunch
eligible students public schools. The differences in means are considerably larger in
Ohio.

Regression Results
The means estimates suggest some statistically distinguishable effects that may
occur due to charter presence, but they are only average changes across the groups of
schools in those states in this period. In this section, I present the results from the school
and year fixed effects regression models that allow me to introduce control variables.
Tables 3.5 to 3.8 present the results from the regression models that estimate the share of
non-Hispanic white students for the four states. Tables 3.9 and 3.12 present the results
from the models that estimate the share of free-lunch eligible students. Tables are
organized in a similar way. Models with the county level competition measure (C1), the
spatial competition measure (C2), and enrollment based competition measure (C3) is
presented in the first, second and third columns respectively. Table 3.13 is a summary
table that tracks the competition variable across all models in the previous tables,
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presenting the results from the basic models and the models with control side by side. In
this table, the coefficient of interest is the interaction term between the post treatment
year and the competition variable. The first row shows the results from the base model
and the second row shows how the coefficient is affected, when the control variables are
included. Similar to previous tables, C1, C2 and C3 are three charter school exposure
measures used throughout the dissertation.
The effects on racial and ethnic distribution
The regression results suggest that the existence of charter schools contributed to
the reduction of the share of non-Hispanic white students in traditional public schools
that face charter competition in all four states. The size of the effect and the sensitivity to
the competition measure varies a bit across states, but the overall negative effect remains
significant across models. The initial regression model for Texas schools shows a 2.9
percentage points decrease in the share of non-Hispanic white students in the treatment
group. With the addition of county level controls to the first specification, the size of the
effect is reduced to 1.1 percentage points but remains significant. For the schools that
experience direct competition within their 5-mile radius, the share of non-Hispanic white
students is reduced by 2.7 percentage points. With the additional controls, the size of the
coefficient is reduced to 1.4, but remains highly significant. In the models with
enrollment-based models, the basic model shows the largest change in share of nonHispanic whites in public schools with a decline of almost 4 percentage points. The
change reduces to 1.4 percentage points and remains highly significant.
In Florida, schools that have charter schools in their county saw the non-Hispanic
white percentage of their students drop by a statistically significant 3.8 percentage points
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more than schools in other counties. Introducing the county level controls reduces the
size of the coefficient by almost half to 1.7 percentage points, but the coefficient remains
significant. Schools with charter schools within five miles saw the non-Hispanic white
percentage drop 1.7 percentage points more than schools without competition that close.
With control variables, we still observe a statistically significant 1 percentage point
reduction. Relative to schools in counties with below median charter school enrollment,
schools in high enrollment counties experienced a 1-point drop in their non-Hispanic
white student population.
The results from New Jersey models also suggest that the introduction of charter
schools reduced the share of white non-Hispanic white students in traditional public
schools by 1.8 percentage points using the county level measure, and by 1.4 percentage
points with both spatially more precise measure and the enrollment measure. In all three
models, the coefficients remain negative and highly significant.
The effect size in Ohio is quite large. Schools in counties with multiple charters
experienced 3.6 percentage point drop in the share of non-Hispanic white student
population. The spatial specification also shows a 3.2 percentage point reduction and the
enrollment specification shows a 2.8 percentage point reduction. With additional
controls, the effect size reduces to 1.3 percentage points in models with county control,
and to 1.4 in models with spatial control and remain significant. In the enrollment based
specification, the coefficient loses significance. To sum, for racial composition outcome,
all specifications show significant and negative effects, except for the schools in counties
with above median charter school enrollment in Ohio.
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Aside from the impacts of charter schools, there are some additional findings with
respect to characteristics of counties. As expected, increases in the percent of white nonHispanics in the 5–19 year old county population led to significant increases in the share
of white students in public schools. In Florida, increases in the proportion of private
school enrollment in the county seemed to influence the share of white students in public
schools positively. In Ohio, increases in the proportion of private school enrollment in the
county are associated with declines in the share of white students in the public schools.
Changes in the county population seemed to influence the share of white students
negatively in Florida and Texas public schools.
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Table 3.5 Estimated Effect of Charter Schools on Public Schools in TEXAS: Percent
non-Hispanic Whites
NHW
(I)
C1

NHW
(II)
-0.011**
(0.002)
-

C2
C3
T
Proportion of white nonHispanics in the 5–19 year
old population
Proportion of 5–17 year olds
in poverty
Log of the total population
Proportion of private school
enrollment
Constant
2

NHW
(III)
-

-

-0.014**
(0.002)
-

-

-0.018**
(0.003)
0.573**
(0.026)

-0.020**
(0.003)
0.569**
(0.026)

-0.014**
(0.003)
-0.022**
(0.003)
0.547**
(0.029)

-0.000
(0.000)
-0.032**
(0.010)
-0.085
(0.083)
0.600***
(0.125)
.9741

-0.000
(0.000)
-0.028**
(0.010)
-0.071
(0.083)
0.560**
(0.125)
.9742

-0.000
(0.000)
-0.040**
(0.010)
-0.076
(0.083)
0.714**
(0.128)
.9741

Adjusted R
Note: (p<.01)= ***, (p>.05)=**, (p<.10)=*, standard errors are in parenthesis

Table 3.6 Estimated Effect of Charter Schools on Public Schools in FLORIDA: Percent
non-Hispanic Whites
NHW
(II)
C1

NHW
(II)

NHW
(III)

C2

-0.017**
(0.006)
-

C3

-

-0.010**
(0.003)
-

T

-0.005
(0.006)
0.579**
(0.039)

-0.013**
(0.004)
0.585**
(0.038)

-0.010**
(0.003)
-0.014**
(0.004)
0.587**
(0.038)

-0.048*
(0.023)
-0.095**
(0.027)
0.338**
(0.101)
1.336**
(0.355)
.9685

-0.032
(0.024)
-0.085**
(0.027)
0.352**
(0.101)
1.293**
(0.355)
.9685

-0.020
(0.024)
-0.088**
(0.027)
0.369**
(0.100)
1.323**
(0.356)
.9685

Proportion of white nonHispanics in the 5–19 year
old population
Proportion of 5–17 year olds
in poverty
Log of the total population
Proportion of private school
enrollment
Constant
2

-

-

Adjusted R
Note: (p<.01)= ***, (p>.05)=**, (p<.10)=*, standard errors are in parenthesis

57

Table 3.7 Estimated Effect of Charter Schools on Public Schools in NEW JERSEY:
Percent non-Hispanic Whites
NHW
(I)
C1

NHW
(II)

NHW
(III)

C2

-0.018**
(0.004)
-

C3

-

-0.014**
(0.003)
-

T

-0.013*
(0.005)
0.265**
(0.045)

-0.020**
(0.003)
0.251**
(0.045)

-0.014**
(0.005)
-0.026**
(0.005)
0.242**
(0.045)

-0.063
(0.056)
-0.062
(0.056)
-0.002
(0.086)
1.297
(0.727)
.9795

-0.090
(0.058)
-0.074
(0.056)
0.077
(0.081)
1.462
(0.722)
.9795

-0.197*
(0.082)
-0.069
(0.057)
0.102
(0.081)
1.416
(0.736)
.9794

Proportion of white nonHispanics in the 5–19 year
old population
Proportion of 5–17 year olds
in poverty
Log of the total population
Proportion of private school
enrollment
Constant
2

-

-

Adjusted R
Note: (p<.01)= ***, (p>.05)=**, (p<.10)=*, standard errors are in parenthesis

Table 3.8 Estimated Effect of Charter Schools on Public Schools in OHIO: Percent nonHispanic Whites
NHW
(I)
C1

NHW
(II)

NHW
(III)

C2

-0.013**
(0.003)
-

C3

-

-0.014**
(0.002)
-

T

0.017**
(0.002)
0.998**
(0.088)

0.017**
(0.002)
1.067**
(0.078)

-0.005
(0.003)
0.017**
(0.002)
1.188**
(0.077)

0.078
(0.058)
-0.003
(0.021)
-0.124
(0.073)
0.028
(0.287)
.9769

0.101
(0.056)
0.012
(0.020)
-0.152*
(0.072)
-0.211
(0.266)
.9770

0.113
(0.061)
0.013
(0.021)
-0.155*
(0.073)
-0.333
(0.286)
.9769

Proportion of white nonHispanics in the 5–19 year
old population
Proportion of 5–17 year olds
in poverty
Log of the total population
Proportion of private school
enrollment
Constant
2

-

-

Adjusted R
Note: (p<.01)= ***, (p>.05)=**, (p<.10)=*, standard errors are in parenthesis
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The effects on the share of free lunch eligible students
The results suggest that charter presence in these states affects the share of freelunch eligible students in traditional public schools in three of these four states. The size
and direction of the effect varies across states. The regression results were not statistically
significant in New Jersey for all three measures. The results from Texas show a
reduction. Relative to schools without charter schools in their county, schools with one or
more charters in their county experienced approximately a 2-point drop in the share of
free-lunch eligible students. With the addition of county level controls, the size of the
effect actually increases to 4.2 percentage points and remains significant at .05 level. In
the models with the spatial measure, charter school presence again contributes to the
reduction in the share of free- lunch eligible students by a statistically significant 2.5
percentage points and with the additional controls the effect size again increases, but
modestly compared to the first specification. For public schools located in counties with
above median charter enrollment, the initial model shows no significant difference, but
with the addition of controls, we observe a significant 2-point drop in the share of freelunch eligible students similar to other models.
The results from Florida schools are complex. Quantity of charter schools impact
the share of free-lunch eligible students in Florida public schools only if the schools have
charter schools within their close proximity (within their 5-mile radius). Relative to other
public schools, public schools with charter schools nearby experienced approximately a
2-point rise in their share of free-lunch eligible students. Additional county level controls
decrease the effect size to a still significant 1.3 percentage points. In other instances, the
models do not show significant effects related to charter schools.
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Ohio models show that the charter school presence contributes to increases in the
share free-lunch eligible students in the traditional Ohio public schools in this period. In
Ohio, both the schools that have at least one charter school in their counties and those
that are located in counties with above median charter enrollment experience a
statistically significant 13.6 percentage points increase in the share free-lunch eligible
students. With the additional controls for county level demographic and socio-economic
changes, the size of the coefficient drops to 3.0 percentage points for the first
specification and 5.0 percentage points for the second specification, but remains highly
significant. I observe the largest effect size for this outcome measure for Ohio schools
that have charter schools within their 5-mile radius. Relative to other public schools,
public schools with charter schools nearby experienced approximately an 18-point rise in
their share of free-lunch eligible students. The controls reduce the effect size to 11.9
percentage points, but the coefficient remains highly significant.

Summary Discussion
Consistent with the findings by Dee and Fu (2004) in Arizona and Ross (2005) in
Michigan, introduction of charter schools appears to reduce the share of non-Hispanic
white students in traditional public schools in all four states. Charter presence, measured
both spatially and by enrollment, shows significant negative effects. The basic models
overestimate the effect and introduction of the control variables reduces the effect size,
but the coefficients remain significant across models for all states. After controlling for
other factors, models show consistent effect sizes that range from 1.0 to 1.9 percentage
points across models in all states.
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If charter presence is systematically associated with declines in the enrollment of
non-Hispanic white students from nearby traditional public schools, this may imply that
some sorting is taking place in the face of charter competition. This does not necessarily
mean that charter schools are attracting more non-Hispanic white students. In fact, in
some states like Texas, charter schools are serving predominantly black students. If
charter schools choose to locate in areas with already high levels of minority
concentration, they may be speeding up the ongoing departure of non-Hispanic white
families to other areas or private schools. This study cannot explain the underlying
mechanism that causes these observed changes, but findings suggest interesting avenues
for further research that may increase our understanding of the charter school effect.
The analyses also show that charter school presence affects the share of free-lunch
eligible students in traditional public schools in different ways in these states. The models
for free-lunch eligible students did not suggest significant results for New Jersey. Only
public schools with charter schools nearby experienced decline in their share of freelunch eligible students in Florida. The regression results showed that the existence of
charter schools contributed to the decline of the share of free-lunch eligible students in
traditional public schools in Texas, but increased the share of free-lunch eligible students
in Ohio. These dissimilar findings in different states may be reflecting differences in
educational histories and operation of charter schools. For example, New Jersey has the
fewest number of charter schools (only 51 charter schools by 2001) among the four
states, so the insignificant results may not be surprising. Maybe the charter schools are
still too few in New Jersey to create any effect on the share of free-lunch students in the
public school system. The more interesting finding is the contradictory results in Ohio
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and Texas. According to National Center for Education Research reports, larger
percentages of black, Hispanic, and American Indian students attend high-poverty
schools than white students (Wirt et al., 2005). Why would charter schools contribute to
the decline of the share of free-lunch eligible students in traditional Texas public schools,
while charter schools in Ohio and Florida contribute to increase of their share in
traditional public schools? One possibility is the effect of the 75 percent provision in
Texas charter legislation. The Texas Legislature passed legislation initially put a cap on
open-enrollment charter schools, but allowed an unlimited number of open-enrollment
charter schools serving students at risk of failure or dropping out of school that serve
more than 75 percent at-risk students. The negative coefficient on the share of free-lunch
eligible students may reflect the transfer of the at-risk students from traditional schools to
charters under the 75 percent rule. These results underline the importance of considering
contextual factors and multiple ways to measure charter effect.
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Table 3.9 Estimated Effect of Charter Schools on Public Schools in TEXAS: Percent
Free-Lunch Eligible

C2

FREE
(I)
-0.042**
(0.005)
-

C3

-

-0.028**
(0.005)
-

T

0.064**
(0.009)
-0.750**
(0.057)

0.053**
(0.009)
-0.673**
(0.056)

-0.023**
(0.006)
-0.044**
(0.009)
-0.687**
(0.062)

0.009**
(0.001)
-0.243**
(0.038)

0.010**
(0.001)
-0.208**
(0.038)

0.010**
(0.001)
-0.191**
(0.039)

0.239
(0.178)
3.093**
(0.396)
.8041

0.254
(0.178)
2.663**
(0.393)
.8028

0.215
(0.178)
2.499**
(0.393)
.8028

C1

Proportion of white
non-Hispanics in the 5–
19 year old population
Proportion of 5–17 year
olds in poverty
Log of the county real
median household
income
Proportion of private
school enrollment
Constant
2

FREE
(II)
-

FREE
(III)
-

Adjusted R
Note: (p<.01)= ***, (p>.05)=**, (p<.10)=*, standard errors are in parenthesis

Table 3.10 Estimated Effect of Charter Schools on Public Schools in FLORIDA: Percent
Free-Lunch Eligible

C2

FREE
(I)
-0.007
(0.006)
-

C3

-

0.013**
(0.004)
-

T

0.011*
(0.006)

-0.001
(0.004)

-0.003
(0.004)
0.007*
(0.004)

-0.185**
(0.048)

-0.159**
(0.048)

-0.178**
(0.047)

0.282**
(0.087)

0.257**
(0.086)

0.284**
(0.089)

0.038
(0.029)

0.033
(0.029)

0.036
(0.029)

-0.063
(0.121)
0.086
(0.334)
.9264

-0.033
(0.120)
0.115
(0.331)
.9268

-0.052
(0.120)
0.090
(0.335)
.9264

C1

Proportion of white
non-Hispanics in the 5–
19 year old population
Proportion of 5–17 year
olds in poverty
Log of the county real
median household
income
Proportion of private
school enrollment
Constant
Adjusted

R2

FREE
(II)
-

FREE
(III)
-

Note: (p<.01)= ***, (p>.05)=**, (p<.10)=*, standard errors are in parenthesis
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Table 3.11 Estimated Effect of Charter Schools on Public Schools in NEW JERSEY:
Percent Free-Lunch Eligible

C2

FREE
(II)
0.006
(0.004)
-

C3

-

-0.000
(0.003)
-

T

-0.003
(0.010)
0.036
(0.048)

-0.003
(0.010)
0.032
(0.048)

-0.000
(0.004)
-0.003
(0.010)
0.032
(0.048)

0.009
(0.059)
-0.056
(0.051)

-0.010
(0.060)
-0.038
(0.049)

-0.013
(0.079)
-0.038
(0.049)

-0.095
(0.079)
0.818
(0.535)
.9689

-0.122
(0.077)
0.631
(0.515)
.9689

-0.123
(0.077)
0.634
(0.517)
.9689

C1

Proportion of white
non-Hispanics in the 5–
19 year old population
Proportion of 5–17 year
olds in poverty
Log of the county real
median household
income
Proportion of private
school enrollment
Constant
2

FREE
(IV)
-

FREE
(VI)
-

Adjusted R
Note: (p<.01)= ***, (p>.05)=**, (p<.10)=*, standard errors are in parenthesis

Table 3.12 Estimated Effect of Charter Schools on Public Schools in OHIO: Percent
Free-Lunch Eligible

C2

FREE
(I)
0.030**
(0.012)
-

C3

-

0.119**
(0.009)
-

T

-0.078**
(0.023)
-3.952**
(0.350)

-0.086**
(0.022)
-3.106**
(0.306)

0.050**
(0.011)
-0.063**
(0.022)
-4.178**
(0.301)

-1.053**
(0.228)
0.157
(0.141)

-0.724**
(0.211)
0.233
(0.135)

-0.734**
(0.245)
0.083
(0.137)

0.041
(0.299)
2.038
(1.587)
.5014

-0.043
(0.289)
0.480
(1.485)
.5254

0.037
(0.297)
2.958*
(1.505)
.5014

C1

Proportion of white
non-Hispanics in the 5–
19 year old population
Proportion of 5–17 year
olds in poverty
Log of the county real
median household
income
Proportion of private
school enrollment
Constant
2

FREE
(II)
-

FREE
(III)
-

Adjusted R
Note: (p<.01)= ***, (p>.05)=**, (p<.10)=*, standard errors are in parenthesis
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CHAPTER 4
EFFECTS ON STUDENT-TEACHER RATIO

Fiscal reasons are the major incentives for public schools to respond to other
school choice alternatives, because in most cases, the students who leave for alternative
schools take some public funding with them. As charter schools are new entities, most
studies have focused on achievement outcomes and few have considered charter school
funding and resources (Sugarman, 2002). Even less attention is given to the potential
impact of charters on public school resources. In a recent study, Dee and Fu (2004, p.
261) asserted that “no study … has presented empirical evidence on whether the
introduction of charter schools actually influenced the resource levels in conventional
public schools.”
Theoretical and anecdotal arguments about the influence of lost resources,
however, provide some evidence on the possible incentives for public schools to change
behavior. For example, in Dayton, Ohio, officials report a $19 million loss from their
annual budget due to charter enrollment (Gewertz, 2002). The Cincinnati Public School
District started a study to find out why hundreds of students are leaving the district for
charter schools as the officials are concerned about the district's budget problems due to
the loss of students to charter schools (Mrozowski, 2005). In Milwaukee, a think tank
estimated a net loss of $22.2 million dollars in state funds to traditional public schools
because of students transferring to private and charter schools (Miner, 1999). A school
board director in Pittsburgh complains that by year's end, the district will have sent nearly
$3.5 million of its $79.38 million budget to charter schools (Tinsley, 2006).
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Researchers argue that public schools will react to the budget loss. Hoxby (1998),
an avid supporter of competition-based school choice, even argues that when the
competition is between similar alternatives like a charter school and a regular public
school, rather than private school competition, public schools will reduce costs more. If
public schools experience increased achievement despite reduced resources, this may
suggest that they have become more efficient providers of schooling.
In this section, I will start by investigating the changes in the student-teacher
ratios across different groups of public schools. Student-teacher ratio is used as an
indicator of both class size and school-level resources. Introduction of charter schools
may decrease the pupil-teacher ratio in regular public schools. On the other hand, many
district officials complain about the loss of students to charter schools and its contribution
to the district's budget problems (Elliott, 2005; Mrozowski, 2005). These financial losses
can lead to reductions in teachers and administrative staff. In Detroit, Michigan, the
teacher federation has been worried that the public schools maybe forced to lay off 4000
employees in the face of enrollment declines due to competition from charter and private
schools (Gehring, 2004). In Los Angeles, it has been reported that hundreds of teachers
and administrators have left the city's school system to take jobs at growing charter
schools (Rubin, 2006). If these concerns are valid, introduction of charter schools may
increase the pupil teacher ratio in regular public schools. This hypothesis will then test
whether charter schools lead to resource reductions in regular public schools.
While the average change in the student-teacher ratio in public schools is far from
a perfect measure of school resources, this chapter focuses on the student-teacher ratio as
an indicator of class size and school level resources to explore whether the charter school
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movement contributes to any changes. In previous work, student-teacher ratio is
commonly used to measure the level of human resources input in terms of number of
teachers in relation to the size of the student population (Borland, Howsen, & Trawick,
2005; Dee & Fu, 2004; Wirt et al., 2005). Therefore, pupil-teacher ratio is an indicator of
both class size and resource levels of schools (Wirt et al., 2005).
In the second part of this section, I will concentrate on the student-teacher ratios
in schools located in counties with high poverty rates to investigate whether the
competitive effects of charter schools are stronger in certain types of environments. We
may expect to observe bigger effects in higher poverty areas for many reasons. If most
charter schools are directed to more disadvantaged or problematic students as suggested
by some scholars, we would expect to see more charter concentration in high poverty
areas. As most of the public school funding comes from real estate values in
neighborhoods, real estate values in poor neighborhoods tend to be low and quality of the
school systems tend to be poor. Charter schools in such poor areas create more options
for low-income parents who have children in poorly performing neighborhood public
schools. The student-teacher ratios in public schools may fall because of student transfers
to charters. However, we may also expect to observe increases in the student-teacher
ratios if the transfers lead to significant financial losses resulting in teachers and
administrative staff cutbacks. In sum, this hypothesis will allow me to test the scope and
significance of competitive pressures in higher poverty areas.
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Previous Research
Student-teacher ratio is a commonly used education indicator. National Center for
Education Statistics compiles indicators from a variety of data sources to provide
information on the current state of education (NCES, 2001). It is also a part of the youth
indicators also published by NCES to provide statistics to describe the circumstances of
young people’s lives in school (Fox, 2005). Table 1 shows the median public school
student-teacher ratio in Texas, Florida, New Jersey, and Ohio.
Table 4.1 Median public school student-teacher ratio, by instructional level for Texas,
Florida, New Jersey, and Ohio: School year 1999-2000
Instructional Level
State
Primary
Middle
High
Texas
15.2
14.2
12.4
Florida
17.2
19.2
18.9
New Jersey
15.4
13.4
13.0
Ohio
17.8
16.0
17.0
50 States Average
16.2
15.5
14.8
Source: National Center for Education Statistics (NCES, 2001)
The student-teacher ratio is not the same as class size although it has been used as
a measure of class size in some previous work. In broad terms, the student-teacher ratio
reflects teacher workload and school resources (Hanushek, 1998). In that sense, NCES
argues “the student-teacher ratio has implications not only for the cost of education, but
also for the quality”(Matheson, Salganik, Phelps, & Perie, 1996). Student-teacher ratio is
calculated by comparing the number of students in a school compared to the number of
all teaching professionals in the school, which may not only include the full time teachers
serving students in the classroom, but also other administrative staff, counselors, or parttime teachers. Because of this discrepancy, the typical class size observed in schools is
larger than the reported student-teacher ratios (Achilles, 2000).
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The impact of class size reduction on student performance has been studied
widely and created controversy among researchers. Reducing the class size for increasing
achievement is a traditional intervention policy that targets educational inputs. Coleman
(1966) concludes that differences in school resources such as class size are relatively
unimportant in explaining student achievement. Others have shown, however, that
students from schools with abundant resources such as lower student-teacher ratios grow
up to have better job market success and earn more than children from poorer schools
(Burtless, 1996). The most extensive information on the effect of school resources in the
form of pupil-teacher ratios comes from the STAR (Student-Teacher Achievement Ratio
Study) experiment. In the mid 1980s, the Tennessee Department of Education conducted
a four-year longitudinal class-size study called Tennessee’s Project STAR (Studentteacher Achievement Ratio) (Mosteller, 1995). In this experimental design, researchers
assigned students and teachers randomly into small and regular classes and tracked the
students from kindergarten to third grade. Studies analyzing STAR data find that class
size has a significant effect on test scores. Finn and Achilles (1990) for example
concluded that "this research leaves no doubt that small classes have an advantage over
larger classes in reading and math in early primary grades."
There is, however, not a consensus on the relationship between resources and
student achievement. Some proponents of the school choice approach to educational
reform also argue that school resources do not matter much in educational outcomes.
Hanushek (1998), for example, reviewed 152 studies of class size and concluded that a
minority of them reported significant relationships between class size and student
achievement. Hanushek also reviewed the STAR project in his literature review and
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argued that the findings from the study showed minor gains for students in earlier grades,
but the interpretation of findings go beyond of what is suggested by the available data.
Other scholars, however, do not agree with Hanushek’s conclusions (Krueger, 2002;
Molnar, 1998). Krueger (2002) criticizes Hanushek’s selection and review method as he
relied on multiple estimates from the same papers and counted each estimate separately
to find the insignificant findings. Krueger counted each publication as only one result and
concluded that the resources are more influential on achievement than is suggested by
Hanushek’s review (Mishel & Rothstein, 2002).
Student-teacher ratios in charter schools are often used as controls in studies
focusing on performance outcomes (e.g. Bifulco & Ladd, 2006; Eberts & Hollenbeck,
2002), but they have not been studied in particular in the charter school context. The only
study that has presented empirical evidence on whether the introduction of charter
schools influenced the student-teacher ratios in traditional public schools was conducted
by Dee and Fu (Dee & Fu, 2004). The authors tracked changes in the student-teacher
ratio in Arizona, which introduced charter schools, and New Mexico, which did not.
They found that student-teacher ratios increased in Arizona public schools and
interpreted this finding as evidence that charter schools drain resources from traditional
schools.
According to the US Department of Education charter school report (Nelson et al.,
2000), the student-teacher ratios in charter schools are slightly smaller, on average, than
other public schools, especially in the earlier grades. Many charter school developers
interviewed in the study reported that they created their schools in part to provide smaller
classes and that parents often chose their schools because their class sizes were low.
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Table 4.2 is adopted from the US Department of Education report (Nelson et al., 2000)
and summarizes the student-teacher ratio for charter and regular public schools.
Table 4.2 Student-teacher ratio for Charter Schools and all Public Schools in the 27
States that have charter schools by 1997
Type of School
Instructional Level
Charter Schools
Public Schools
Primary
15.8
17.6
Middle
15.4
16.4
High
16.4
16.5
N
945
51,505
Source: table adopted from The State of Charter Schools 2000 - Fourth-Year Report, which
uses U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Common
Core of Data Survey, 1997-98.
Empirical Results
The CCD data contains student-teacher ratio variable, which is calculated by
dividing the total number of students by the number of full-time equivalent classroom
teachers. This chapter focuses on the student-teacher ratios in Texas, Florida, New Jersey
and Ohio public schools by using similarly specified models as in the previous chapters.
In table 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6, I report the student-teacher ratios in these four states
for groups of schools. The first treatment group (C1) includes traditional public schools
that have one or more charter schools in the same county. The second treatment group
(C2) includes traditional public schools, which have at least one charter school within
their 5-mile radius. The third treatment group (C3) includes traditional public schools,
which are located in counties where charter schools enroll more than the median
percentage of public students. The estimates show that the student-teacher ratios in
traditional public schools located in counties with above median charter enrollments or
that have charter schools in their county or within their 5-mile radius, fell from 1995-96
school year to 2001-02 school year across all states. The results show that there is also a
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decrease in the student-teacher ratios in other control schools, but the size of the change
is smaller. There is a decrease of about 1 in student-teacher ratios in Texas and Florida
schools across all specifications, and decrease of about 2 in New Jersey and Ohio
schools.
Table 4.3 Mean Differences in the Student-Teacher Ratios for Traditional Public Schools
in Texas*
Student-teacher Ratio
C1
C2
C3
1995-96
Treatment
16.16
16.23
16.42
2001-02
15.11
15.19
15.43
Difference
-1.05
-1.04
-0.99
1995-96
Control
13.95
14.38
14.73
2001-02
12.97
13.38
13.76
Difference
-0.98
-1.0
-0.97
Difference-in-differences
-0.07
-0.04
-0.02
* C1 refers to the county level measure (Public schools that have one or more charter schools in their host
county); C2 refers to the spatial measure (Public schools that have one or more charter schools within their
5-mils radius); C3 refers to the enrollment measure (Public schools that are in counties with above median
charter enrollment).

Table 4.4 Mean Differences in the Student-Teacher Ratios for Traditional Public Schools
in Florida*
Student-teacher Ratio
C1
C2
C3
1995-96
Treatment
18.86
18.88
19.02
2001-02
17.83
17.68
17.86
Difference
-1.03
-1.12
-1.16
1995-96
Control
18.93
18.84
18.71
2001-02
18.29
18.23
17.91
Difference
-0.64
-0.61
-0.8
Difference-in-differences
-0.39
-0.51
-0.36
* C1 refers to the county level measure (Public schools that have one or more charter schools in their host
county); C2 refers to the spatial measure (Public schools that have one or more charter schools within their
5-mils radius); C3 refers to the enrollment measure (Public schools that are in counties with above median
charter enrollment).
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Table 4.5 Mean Differences in the Student-Teacher Ratios for Traditional Public Schools
in New Jersey*
Student-teacher Ratio
C1
C2
C3
1995-96
Treatment
15.70
15.76
15.65
2001-02
14.10
14.00
13.71
Difference
-1.60
-1.76
-1.94
1995-96
Control
15.69
15.62
15.73
2001-02
13.69
14.03
14.19
Difference
-2.00
-1.59
-1.54
Difference-in-differences
0.4
-0.17
-0.40
* C1 refers to the county level measure (Public schools that have one or more charter schools in their host
county); C2 refers to the spatial measure (Public schools that have one or more charter schools within their
5-mils radius); C3 refers to the enrollment measure (Public schools that are in counties with above median
charter enrollment).

Table 4.6 Mean Differences in the Student-Teacher Ratios for Traditional Public Schools
in Ohio*
Student-teacher Ratio
C1
C2
C3
1995-96
Treatment
18.79
18.80
18.37
2001-02
16.31
15.97
15.90
Difference
-2.48
-2.83
-2.47
1995-96
Control
19.88
19.65
19.59
2001-02
17.64
17.57
17.54
Difference
-2.24
-2.08
-2.05
Difference-in-differences
-0.24
-0.75
-0.42
* C1 refers to the county level measure (Public schools that have one or more charter schools in their host
county); C2 refers to the spatial measure (Public schools that have one or more charter schools within their
5-mils radius); C3 refers to the enrollment measure (Public schools that are in counties with above median
charter enrollment).

Table 4.7, 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 present the results from the regression models that
estimate the student-teacher ratio. The coefficient of interest is the interaction term
between post year and the competition measure (C1, C2 and C3). Similar to tables in
previous chapters, C1, C2 and C3 are three competition measures used throughout the
dissertation.
In the Texas models, charter schools seemed to have no effect on student-teacher
ratios of traditional public schools. The coefficients on interaction terms are all
insignificant. Increase in the ratio of school age non-Hispanic white population in the
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county is associated with increases in the student-teacher ratios. In Florida, the charter
coefficients are negative and significant across three specifications. Interestingly, with the
addition of the controls to the first model, the coefficient on the interaction term loses
significance, although it still shows a negative effect for schools with at least one
operational charter school in their county. For the schools that experience direct
competition within their 5-mile radius, student-teacher ratio is reduced by .6, an average
decrease of about 3 percent. With the additional controls, the size of the coefficient is
reduced to .5, but remains highly significant. For schools in counties with at or above
median charter school enrollment, the regression results show a negative effect. The size
of the effect declines with additional controls from .4 to .3, but remains significant.
In New Jersey models, the results are mixed. There are no significant effects in
schools with charters within 5-mile radius. Interestingly, for schools in counties with at or
above median charter school enrollment, the regression results suggest that introduction
of charter schools decreased student-teacher ratios in traditional schools by about .4. The
size of the effect declines to .1 in the enrollment based model with additional controls,
but the effect is no longer significant. For schools that have charters in their county, the
effect size increases to .6 and remains significant.
In Ohio, only schools that have charter schools within their 5-mile radius
experience their student-teacher drop by a statistically significant .8 more than schools
without competition that close. Introducing the county level controls in this case
strengthens the size of the coefficient to .9, and the coefficient remains significant.
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Table 4.7 Estimated Effect of Charter Schools on Public Schools in TEXAS: Studentteacher Ratio
(I)

(II)

(III)

-

-

C2

-0.035
(0.086)
-

-

C3

-

-0.064
(0.082)
-

T

-1.009**
(0.100)
3.724**
(1.000)

-1.013**
(0.100)
3.285**
(0.970)

C1

Proportion of white
non-Hispanics in the 5–
19 year old population
Proportion of 5–17 year
olds in poverty
Log of total population

-0.031*
-0.037**
(0.013)
(0.013)
0.009
0.037
(0.378)
(0.013)
Proportion of private
4.592
4.693
school enrollment
(3.127)
(3.128)
Constant
13.845**
13.866**
(4.756)
(4.752)
2
0.6063
0.6063
Adjusted R
Note: (p<.01)= ***, (p>.05)=**, (p<.10)=*, standard errors are in parenthesis

0.176
(0.102)
-.932**
(0.105)
5.083**
(1.099)
-0.020
(0.014)
0.332
(0.387)
5.772
(3.179)
8.844
(4.940)
0.6053

Table 4.8 Estimated Effect of Charter Schools on Public Schools in FLORIDA: Studentteacher Ratio

C2

(I)
-0.041
(0.169)
-

C3

-

-0.449**
(0.110)
-

T

-1.073**
(0.198)
9.031**
(1.309)

-0.790**
(0.150)
8.185**
(1.277)

C1

Proportion of white
non-Hispanics in the 5–
19 year old population
Proportion of 5–17 year
olds in poverty
Log of total population

(II)
-

(III)
-

-0.710
-0.323
(0.795)
(0.797)
3.950**
3.487**
(0.902)
(0.897)
Proportion of private
2.883
2.029
school enrollment
(3.406)
(3.387)
Constant
-37.967**
-31.452**
(12.048)
(12.048)
2
0.6699
0.6724
Adjusted R
Note: (p<.01)= ***, (p>.05)=**, (p<.10)=*, standard errors are in parenthesis
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-0.247*
(0.110)
-0.947**
(0.147)
8.681**
(1.275)
-0.205
(0.826)
3.652**
(0.903)
2.910
(3.388)
-34.006**
(12.044)
0.6707

Table 4.9 Estimated Effect of Charter Schools on Public Schools in NEW JERSEY:
Student-teacher Ratio

C2

(I)
0.548**
(0.182)
-

C3

-

-0.038
(0.145)
-

T

-1.478**
(0.247)
8.018**
(2.086)

-1.202**
(0.232)
8.600**
(2.082)

C1

Proportion of white nonHispanics in the 5–19 year old
population
Proportion of 5–17 year olds in
poverty
Log of total population

(II)
-

(III)
-

12.458**
10.600**
(2.612)
(2.702)
1.653
3.373
(2.590)
(2.576)
Proportion of private school
-3.405
-7.994*
enrollment
(3.966)
(3.761)
Constant
-12.097
-34.023
(33.628)
(33.447)
2
0.5677
0.5658
Adjusted R
Note: (p<.01)= ***, (p>.05)=**, (p<.10)=*, standard errors are in parenthesis

-0.118
(0.213)
-1.240**
(0.238)
8.551**
(2.083)
9.268*
(3.807)
3.365
(2.629)
-8.152*
(3.746)
-37.204
(34.037)
0.5659

Table 4.10 Estimated Effect of Charter Schools on Public Schools in OHIO: Studentteacher Ratio

C2

(I)
-0.226
(0.206)
-

C3

-

-0.901**
(0.164)
-

T

-2.275**
(0.150)
-2.244
(6.249)

-2.490**
(0.148)
-8.868
(5.509)

C1

Proportion of white
non-Hispanics in the 5–
19 year old population
Proportion of 5–17 year
olds in poverty
Log of total population

(II)
-

(III)
-

-2.675
-4.731
(4.121)
(3.993)
4.600**
4.194**
(1.483)
(1.421)
Proportion of private
0.172
0.543
school enrollment
(5.177)
(5.112)
Constant
-34.471
-23.603
(20.380)
(18.855)
2
.5368
.5407
Adjusted R
Note: (p<.01)= ***, (p>.05)=**, (p<.10)=*, standard errors are in parenthesis
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-0.302
(0.393)
-2.085**
(0.279)
-11.301
(10.087)
-9.160
(8.027)
4.503
(2.802)
4.916
(9.591)
-44.383
(37.451)
.2021

Results for schools located in high poverty areas
In this section, I will concentrate on the student teacher ratios in schools located
in counties with high poverty rates. The purpose of these analyses is to investigate
whether competitive effects are larger in higher poverty counties than lower poverty
counties. If most charter schools target disadvantaged students concentrated in poor
areas, we might observe more charter concentration in high poverty areas and drop in
student-teacher ratios of public schools because of student transfers to charters. Similarly,
if the schools in high poverty areas are especially hard hit by the decline in school
funding and address this change by cutting back in teaching and administrative personnel
student-teacher ratios may increase more in these schools.
In order to investigate whether the competitive effects of charter schools are more
or less observable in poor areas, I have identified counties with poverty rates for schoolaged children higher than the 75th percentile of all counties in the state in 1996 and rerun
the models for this subgroup of schools. These sub-samples include fewer schools than
the original models. Texas models include traditional public schools in counties with
more than 27.8 percent of 5–17 year olds in poverty (1780 schools). Florida models
include traditional public schools in counties with more than 22.8 percent of 5–17 year
olds in poverty (584 schools). New Jersey models include traditional public schools in
counties with more than 18.1 percent of 5–17 year olds in poverty (601 schools). Ohio
models include traditional public schools in counties with more than more than 18.6
percent of 5–17 year olds in poverty (893 schools).
Tables 4.11 shows the summary results from these models, alongside the original
results for all schools. The coefficient of interest is the interaction term between three
charter school specifications and the post legislation year. The first row shows the initial
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regression results and the second row shows the coefficient after control variables are
included in the model. In the Texas models, charter schools still seemed to have no effect
on student-teacher ratios of traditional public schools located in high poverty areas. The
coefficients on interaction terms remain insignificant, however, in schools that experience
direct competition within their 5-mile radius or located in high charter enrollment
counties, the coefficient on the charter competition variable changes sign and shows an
increase of pupil/teacher ratios.
In Florida, the charter coefficients are negative and significant across three
specifications in models that include all schools. When the models are run for schools
located in poor areas, the coefficients loses significance expect for public schools with
charter schools close by. In New Jersey models, there are still no significant effects in
schools with charters within 5-mile radius. Interestingly, for schools in counties with at or
above median charter school enrollment, the size of the effect rises from .548 to
1.504 and remains significant. In Ohio, similarly specified models do not show
significant effects on student-teacher ratios of schools in poor counties.
Summary Discussion
In their study on Arizona, Dee and Fu (2004) found that charter schools led to a
statistically significant increase of 6 percent in their student-teacher ratios of public
schools. The analysis in this chapter shows that the effect of charter schools on studentteacher ratios in public schools are different in Texas, Ohio, Florida and New Jersey.
Most models did not show significant coefficients, and the significant coefficients are in
general negative.
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Unlike race models, the results from the student-teacher ratio models are not
consistent across states and measures, so it is difficult to characterize the findings. In
Texas, none of the models showed significant coefficients, so the models suggest that
charter schools did not cause any change in student-teacher ratios of traditional Texas
schools during this period. In Florida, both schools with charter schools within five miles
and schools in counties with above median charter school enrollment experience drops in
student-teacher ratios. The repeated analysis of the sub-sample of schools located in
counties with high poverty rates showed generally insignificant coefficients, with the
exception of New Jersey model. Schools in counties with above median charter
enrollment experience an increase of 1.5 in student-teacher ratio after the controls are
added.
It is not clear whether the slight drops in the student-teacher ratios of Florida
public schools are caused by decreases in student enrollment or increases in number of
teachers during that period. This question is difficult to answer with existing data, but it
would be interesting to study the basis of this observed change. Further work is also
needed to understand the rise of student-teacher ratios in schools located in poorer New
Jersey counties; however, it is promising to see that charter schools do not lead to overall
increases in student-teacher ratios in traditional public schools in these four states.
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CHAPTER 5
EFFECTS ON ACADEMIC OUTCOMES

No other question in charter school literature has caused so much passionate
discussion as performance. The evidence on the impact of charter schools on the
achievement levels of their students, as well as their effect on achievement of nonchoosers are mixed and the debate remains contentious, reflecting the diverse opinions on
the school choice issue in general. In 2004, the New York Times published a front-page
story headlined “Nation’s Charter Schools Lagging Behind, U.S. Test Scores Reveal”,
summarizing the negative findings of the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) report
based on the early data from the federally-sponsored National Assessment of Educational
Progress (NAEP)(Schemo, 2004). The article attracted widespread national attention and
engendered an unusual response in scholarly debates, a full-page rebuttal advertisement
by several academicians and charter school supporters. The ad points to the ideological
stand of the AFT and discusses the methodological flaws in the AFT report and the
standards for methodological quality in charter school research. Other newspaper stories
about the reactions to the AFT report followed (Fuller 2004; Howell, Peterson, & West,
2004; Kelly & Szabo, 2004). The U.S. Secretary of Education issued a statement
regarding the article (Paige, 2004). In the months following the incident, other research
papers and reports on charter school performance were published and publicized. In
2005, Carnoy, Jacobsen, Mishel, and Rothstein (2005) published a book called The
Charter School Dust-Up: Examining the Evidence on Enrollment and Achievement, in
which they review the controversy, the literature regarding charter school performance
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and criticize the overreaction of charter school supporters who placed the ad in the New
York Times, by referring them as charter school zealots. The authors even criticize some
of the researchers who signed the NY Times ad for not satisfying the standards for
methodological quality in their own research. The most recent U.S. Department of
Education report using the same National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP)
data also concluded that charter school students had lower mathematics and reading
achievement scores on average when compared with their counterparts in regular public
schools (Braun, Jenkins, & Grigg, 2006). The controversy surrounding the publication of
the New York Times article on charter school performance and following reactions
demonstrate the magnitude of interest and compassion regarding charter school reform.
The controversy illustrates the highly charged atmosphere surrounding the charter
school reform and charter school research. In this chapter, I focus again on the impact of
charter schools on performance of other traditional public schools. In the following
section, first, I will review the previous research findings. Then, I will present the
empirical findings on the achievement outcomes from this study.
Previous Research
Reviews of Studies Comparing Charter and Traditional Public School Achievement
Performance of charter school students is at the heart of the controversy
surrounding charter schools. Most research focuses on achievement of charter school
students and compares achievement between charter and regular school students. Not
only do the individual studies find mixed and even conflicting results, but also different
reviews of the literature on academic outcomes draw different conclusions on the overall
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effectiveness of charter schools based on these studies. Table 5.1 provides a list of recent
studies that review research findings on charter school achievement.

Table 5.1. Literature Reviews on Charter School Achievement
Year
Authors
Source
2001 Gill, Timpane, Ross, and
Chapter 3: Academic Achievement, Rhetoric
Brewer
versus Reality: What We Know and What We
Need To Know About Vouchers and Charter
Schools (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND).
2001 Miron and Nelson
Student Academic Achievement in Charter
Schools: What We Know and Why We Know
So Little, Occasional Paper No. 41, National
Center for the Study of Privatization in
Education Teachers College, Columbia
University.
2005 Carnoy, Jacobsen, Mishel, Chapter 5: What we know about relative
and Rothstein,
charter and regular public school student
achievement in The Charter School Dust-Up:
Examining the Evidence on Enrollment and
Achievement (New York, NY: Teachers Colege
Press)
2006 Hassel and Terrell
Charter School Achievement: What We Know.
Charter School Leadership Council Report.
2006 Hill, Angel, and
Charter School Achievement Studies,
Christensen
Education Finance and Policy,1,1, 139-150.
2006 Berends, Watral, Teasley, Charter school effects on achievement: where
and Nicotera
we are and where we’re going, paper presented
in National Center on School Choice
conference, Vanderbilt University, Nashville,
TN.
Gill, Timpane, Ross and Brewer (2001) summarize the empirical evidence related
to academic achievement under charter programs until 2001. Their review is based on the
findings of only three statewide studies that focus on Michigan, Arizona, and Texas,
which were three of the states with the largest number of charter schools by 2001. Based
on the negative results from Michigan, positive results from Arizona and the mixed
results from Texas, the authors conclude that the evidence suggests reason for cautious
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optimism. Miron and Nelson (2001) review 15 studies that focus on charter schools’
impact on student achievement. The authors rate the existing studies and weight the
impacts by methodological quality. They conclude that the charter impact on student
achievement is mixed or very slightly positive.
In a more recent book, Carnoy, Jacobsen, Mishel, and Rothstein (2005) reviewed
NAEP data and 19 studies with a state by state categorization. The authors conclude that
based on standardized test scores, the performance of charter schools is not higher and in
some states lower than those of their counterparts in regular public schools. Although
some of the studies show positive gains for charter students, the authors conclude that the
average effect is negative. In one of the author’s (Mishel) words (N. Coleman, 2005):
“The evidence that charter schools do not outperform regular public schools suggests that
while some charters may be a benefit to students, others do great harm… Charter schools
were designed to be experimental; it should be no surprise that some experiments lead to
failures, experiences that can provide useful lessons.”
In a report prepared for the Charter School Leadership Council, Hassel (2006)
reviews 58 comparative analyses of charter and district performance. He divides the
studies that compare achievement into three groups as individual level panel studies,
other change studies that investigate, for example, average school-wide scores, and
snapshot studies, which investigate cross-sectional data. Of the 58 studies, 25 look only at
a snapshot of performance with mixed results, while other 33 studies look at change over
time in student or school performance, with relatively positive results for charter schools.
The author concludes that the findings from the panel-based studies suggest encouraging
results for charter schools and believes: “Charter schooling represents an experiment
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worth continuing – and refining to improve quality further over time”(Hassel & Terrell,
2006, p. 2).
Hill, Angel and Christensen (2006) review 35 studies focusing on charter schools
and academic achievement by methodological sophistication. The results are extremely
mixed: 15 find positive effects, 10 find negative effects and 10 report neutral or mixed
findings. The authors conclude that even the five most sophisticated studies present
mixed results, with two reporting positive effects, two reporting mixed results, and one
reporting negative effects. The authors conclude that some charter schools have definite
positive outcomes, however, “these average out when combined with large numbers of
schools that have small or slightly negative outcomes” (Hill, Angel & Christensen, 2006,
p. 146).
Berends, Watral, Teasley and Nicotera (Berends, Watral, Teasley, & Nicotera,
2006) review the above-mentioned reviews. The authors argue that these studies, with the
exception of Miron and Nelson, do not utilize meta-analytic procedures and may be
subject to publication bias as they only include published studies. The authors aspire to
use meta-analysis techniques to systematically explore the impacts of charter schools
aiming to better understand the mixed results. The authors emphasize the importance of
looking into the mixed results to understand the conditions under which researchers
observe positive impacts. This paper, however, is just a preamble that describes some of
the ongoing research activities.
Table 5.2 is adapted from Hassel (2006) and provides a list of studies that
compare achievement in public and charter schools according to the methods they used.
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The geographical focus of each study is listed in the parentheses following the authors’
names.
Table 5.2. Studies Comparing Charter and Traditional Public School Achievement
Panel studies following
individual students over
time

Other change studies

Cross-sectional Studies

Ballou, Teasley, and
Zeidner (ID)
Bifulco & Ladd (NC)*
Booker et al. (TX)
Florida Department of
Education (FL)
Florida Office of Program
Policy Analysis and
Governmental
Accountability (FL)
Gronberg & Jansen (TX)*+
Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin
(TX)*
Hoxby & Rockoff
(Chicago)*
Massachusetts Department
of Education (MA)
Miron (DE)
Miron et al (DE)
Noblit & Dickson (NC)
Sass (FL)*
Solmon & Goldschmidt
(AZ) *
Zimmer et al. (CA)

Bettinger (MI)*+
Carr & Staley (OH)
EdSource (CA)
Greene, Forster, & Winters
(multi)
Loveless (multi)
Metis Associates (KC, MO)
Miron & Horn (CT)*
Miron & Nelson (MI)*
Miron, Nelson & Risley
(PA)*
NY Board of Regents (NY)
Raymond (CA)*
Rogosa (CA)*
Shapley et al (TX)
Slovacek et al. (CA)*
Solmon, Paark and
Garcia(AZ) +
Zimmer et al. (CA)*

Bates & Guile (OR)
Bifulco & Ladd (NC)*
Colorado Department of
Education (CO)*
Chicago Public Schools
(Chicago)
Eberts & Hollenbeck (MI)*
Finnigan et al. (multi)
Florida Department of
Education (FL)
Gronberg and Jansen (TX)
Hoxby (national)*
Henig et al. (DC)*
Legis. Office of Ed.
Oversight (OH)
Loveless (multi)*
Nelson, Rosenberg, & Van
Meter (national)
Nelson & Miron (IL)*
Noblit & Dickson (NC)
Plucker et al (GA)
Raymond (CA)*
Roy & Mishel (national)
Stevens, Jean (NY)
U.S. Department of Ed.
(national)
Was & Kristjansson (UT)
Witte et al. (WI)*
Zimmer et al. (CA)*

Note: * indicates that the study is also reviewed in Carnoy et al. (2005). +indicates studies reviewed in Gill,
Timpane, Ross and Brewer (2001).

87

Impact of Charter Schools on Performance of Traditional Public Schools
The studies and the reviews discussed so far focus on comparing achievement in
charter schools and traditional public schools. Supporters of the systemic or competitive
effects argument, however, assert that regardless of how well charter schools compare
with traditional schools, their existence will benefit the public school system by creating
competition for traditional schools. Hoxby (2001, p. 1) explains this position clearly:
As a rule, the key way in which organizations respond to competition is by
becoming more efficient. This tendency is so strong that we often say that an
organization has ‘become more competitive’ when we really mean that it has
become more efficient or productive in response to competition. Thus, it is not
only possible, but likely, that regular public schools will respond to competition
from choice schools by raising their pupils’ achievement or raising another pupil
outcome valued by parents. Better outcomes are the way in which a regular public
school would evince increased efficiency.

In the context of charter schools, this translates into changes in the behaviors of
public school administrators, such as introduction of new techniques and innovations to
increase achievement when faced with the possibility of losing students and funding. In
addition, potential changes in student composition can affect academic achievement in
public schools. If charters absorb the more disadvantaged or problematic students,
performance in traditional public schools may increase. Findings from the previous
chapters show that in these four states, charter presence lead to declines in the enrollment
of non-Hispanic white students from nearby traditional public schools. The regression
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results also showed that charter schools contribute to the decline of the share of freelunch eligible students in traditional public schools in Texas, but increase the share of
free-lunch eligible students in Ohio
Although the competition argument is voiced often amongst school choice
supporters, papers analyzing the actual performance increase empirically due to
competition from charter schools are still a limited fraction of the literature. Not
surprisingly, the findings from this literature are also mixed and sometimes contradictory
even between studies that focus on the same state. Table 5.3 provides a list of studies that
focus on competition effects in public school achievement or studies that may have some
findings that are relevant to the competitive effects discussion.
Hoxby (2001; 2003) studies the competitive effects of charter schools in
Michigan and Arizona. She concludes that in districts with high charter school
enrollment, achievement in public schools has increased over the years. She uses 6
percent or more charter school enrollment as the critical threshold and classifies public
schools in such district as facing competition. Based on this criterion, she uses differencein-differences estimates to compare schools that do and do not face competition over the
same time period for 4th graders. The selection of the 6 percent criterion is arbitrary, and
she does not explain why the effects start at this cut-off point. The author also does not
use any county or district level controls in these analyses.
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Table 5.3. Studies on Traditional Public School Achievement due to Charter Competition
State Authors
Methodological Findings Competition measure
approach
MI
AZ

Hoxby
(2001,
2003)

MI

Eberts &
Hollenbec
k (2002)
Bettinger
(1999,
2005)
Bifulco &
Ladd
(2004)

MI
NC

NC

- School level
difference-indifferences
regression
- School level
lagged panel
regression
- school level
panel regression

-positive
effect

- 6 percent or more charter school
enrollment in the district

- no
effect

- dichotomous variable for presence
of a charter school in the district

- no
effect

- number of schools within 5-mile
radius of a public school

- Student fixed- no
effect regressions effect

Holmes,
DeSimone
& Rupp
(2003,
2006)
Bohte
(2004)

- School level
lagged panel
regression

-positive
effect

- district level
pooled timeseries regression

-positive
effect

TX

Booker,
Gilpatric,
Gronberg
and Jansen
(2004)

- Student fixed-positive
effect regressions effect

FL

Sass
(2006)

- Student fixed-positive
effect regressions effect

TX
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- 3 dichotomous variables based on
distance (the school attended by the
student is within 2.5 miles of a
charter school, between 2.5 and 5
miles of the nearest charter school,
and between 5 and 10 miles of the
nearest charter school)
- 3 dichotomous variables based on
number of schools (the school had
one, two, or more than two charter
schools located within 5 miles)
- the distance between the public
school and the closest charter school

- dichotomous variable for presence
of a charter school in the district and
number of charter schools in the
district
- the percent of public school
students in a district that attend a
charter school
- the sum of net flow of students in
the current year and all previous
years.
- presence of nearby charter schools
- the number of competing charters
- enrollment share of charter schools

Other studies also focusing on Michigan find different results. As part of a study
examining the achievement of charter school students, Eberts and Hollenbeck (2002) also
investigate whether there is evidence for indirect effects of charter schools on
achievement in public schools in Michigan. They use three years of test score data and
achievement in traditional public schools in Michigan, and included a dummy variable
for presence of a charter school in the district. In contrast to Hoxby’s findings, their
results show little achievement gain in writing and science, but gains in math and reading.
They conclude that there is little evidence that supports competitive effects on test scores
in Michigan schools.
Bettinger (1999; 2005) uses school-level data from Michigan’s standardized
testing program and analyzes whether charter schools have any effect on test scores in
neighboring public schools. The author uses the number of schools within a 5-mile radius
of a public school as an indicator of competition and estimates the effect of this measure
on public school test scores. As Michigan’s charter law allows state universities to
approve charter schools and universities use this right extensively, the author also uses
the proximity of a public school to one of these state universities as an instrument for the
likelihood that charter schools were established nearby as an additional control for
possible endogeneity. Bettinger concludes that charter schools have had no significant
effects on test scores in neighboring public schools in Michigan. It should be noted
however that the study estimates the effects of charter schools on public schools’ math
scores by comparing the two after just one year and focuses on the effects of newly
created schools.
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Bifulco and Ladd (2004) use individual level panel data to estimate the impact of
charter schools on their own students and on students in nearby traditional public schools
in North Carolina. Because they have detailed student level data, they are able to control
for student fixed effects and to track the moves of students from a regular public school
to a charter school or back over time. They use the number of charter schools within 5miles and the distance to the nearest charter school and estimate the effects of these two
measures on public school students’ test scores over time. The authors find that in both
math and reading, charter schools have no statistically significant effects on the
achievement of the traditional public school students. Analyzing the likelihood of losing
students to charter schools as an indicator of intensity of the competition, the authors
caution, however, that the generalizability of their results is limited as the amount of
competition provided by charter schools in North Carolina is small.
In contrast, Holmes, DeSimone and Rupp (2003; 2006) found test score gains in
public schools from charter competition in North Carolina. They used school-level
performance data from 1996 to 2000 provided by the North Carolina Department of
Public Instruction. The authors use the distance between the public school and the closest
charter school as their competition measure, which they refer to as a price variable as it
theoretically measures the cost of attending a charter school. The authors found that an
approximate one percent increase in achievement when a traditional school faces
competition from a charter school.
Bohte (2004) analyzed school districts in Texas, rather than schools. He used
pooled time series data from 1996 to 2002 to analyze the overall pass rate of 10th grade
for each school district in Texas TAAS test. The study covers the years after competition
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is introduced. Charter school competition is incorporated into the models by simply
adding a dummy variable to show the existence of a charter school in the district or a
variable to show the total number of charter schools in the district. The results show that
charter schools contribute to modest overall performance improvements for traditional
public school students, and that the performance gain is stronger for low-income students.
It should be noted that district level analysis may produce a noisier measure of the impact
than a school or student level analyses. Additionally, as the majority of the charter
schools serve lower grades, these results may underestimate their impact.
Booker, Gilpatric, Gronberg and Jansen (2004) analyze student-level panel data
on test scores for public school students over an eight-year period. They evaluate the
impact of charter schools on public school students’ achievement in Texas. Because these
researchers were able to obtain detailed student-level data, they were able to control for
both student and school level fixed effects and even some family background
characteristics as well as to investigate individual student gains in test scores. The authors
measure charter school competition first as the percent of public school students in a
district that attend a charter school and second as the cumulative net flows of students to
charters for each school. They find a positive but small effect of charter schools on public
school test scores in Texas.
Sass (2006) also utilizes panel data on individual students who attended
traditional public schools and took the Florida achievement test in 2000 and 2001. The
author uses presence of nearby charter schools, the number of competing charters, and
the enrollment share of charter schools as charter competition measures and concludes
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that competition from charters has a modest but positive impact on math scores and no
impact in reading scores in Florida’s traditional public schools.
Overall, the literature on competition effects is still in its infancy as relatively a
small number of studies focus on systemic effects in a number of states. So, the mixed
results are not surprising. A few trends in these studies are worth noting. First is the
growing interest, especially by economists, in the effects of charter school competition on
public school achievement as evidenced by the expanding literature. As better
quantitative data becomes available, it will become increasingly important to observe the
effects of charter schools on the achievement of their students as well as on other students
who stay in traditional public schools. Second is the focus on a particular state in most
studies. As the states have quite distinct educational histories in terms of both their
charter school legislation and other educational policies, it is reasonable to observe
varying effects in different states. As more and more studies with different approaches
accumulate, we may be in a better position to understand some of the inter-state
variations. Third is the use of various competition measures. Some of the variation in the
observed effects may be due to different formulations of charter exposure. Studies that
use similar measures in different contexts may increase our understanding of the charter
impact.
Empirical Results
While the use of test scores to measure performance is contentious, many
researchers have used test scores as an indicator of school quality and academic
achievement. This chapter focuses on the available school-level average test scores in
Texas, Ohio and Florida to replicate the models in the previous chapters. The purpose of
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these analyses is to examine whether average test scores rose or fell in response to charter
competition. The observed changes in student compositions and student-teacher ratios
studied in the earlier chapters may explain some of the changes in the test scores, so the
models in this chapter also include controls for the percentage of students who are nonHispanic white, the percentage of students who are eligible for free-lunch and the
student-teacher ratios at the school level.
I gather available data from 1995 and 2001 from the state department of education
web sites. For Texas, I use Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS) test results,
which was administered annually by Texas Department o Education (TEA) until 2003.
The test measures student achievement in reading, writing and mathematics. Passing rates
by grade in reading, writing and mathematics are also available from 1995 to 2001 for
Ohio schools through Ohio Department of Education. In Florida, I use the only publicly
available school level test scores that span from 1995 to 2000, which is the Florida
Writing Assessment Program (FWAP) test results. In New Jersey, Elementary School
Proficiency Assessment (ESPA) test results are publicly available only from 1998 to
2001. The dependent variables for these analyses are pass rates for schools in these
statewide tests. I discuss the results state by state in the following sections. I again start
by reporting the means for groups of schools. The first treatment group (C1) includes
traditional public schools that have one or more charter schools in the same county. The
second treatment group (C2) includes traditional public schools, which have at least one
charter school within their 5-mile radius. The third treatment group (C3) includes
traditional public schools, which are located in counties where charter schools enroll
more than the median percentage of public students. The general hypothesis regarding
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systemic effects of charter schools argues that competition for students would lead to
higher student achievement in traditional public schools. In this section, I will test
whether charter school competition measured in different ways increase the test scores in
public schools.
Texas
The Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS) is administered annually by
Texas Department of Education (TEA). TAAS measures student achievement in reading,
writing and mathematics at grades 3 through 8 and 10. The dependent variables used in
these analyses are overall pass rate for each school on the TAAS (all tests summed across
all grades) and overall pass rate for each school on the TAAS math test (math test
summed across all grades). The overall passing rate is calculated by dividing the number
of students who passed a subject test in all grades that are served by the school by the
total number of students who took the test in the school. These average scores in TAAS
and TAKS (after 2001) have been used widely as an overall measure of school quality in
Texas ( e.g. Bohte, 2004; Enns, 2004).
The pass rates increased for both treatment and control group schools during that
period. The change is approximately 20 percentage points across all specifications and
quite substantial for a six-year period. Although the TAAS has been considered the most
comprehensive of all state testing systems (Greene, 2001) and used in many research
papers (e.g. Grissmer, Flanagan, Kawata, & Williamson, 2000), some researchers have
argued against the validity of TAAS scores (Klein, Hamilton, McCaffrey, & Stecher,
2000). Some suggested that the results overstate achievement gains in Texas and the
passing score is arbitrarily determined by TEA (Haney, 2000). It is especially interesting
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that two RAND reports published in 2000 concluded somewhat differently on Texas
achievement gains based on the TAAS data (Grissmer, Flanagan, Kawata, & Williamson,
2000; Klein, Hamilton, McCaffrey, & Stecher, 2000).
Grissmer, Flanagan, Kawata, and Williamson (2000) suggests that students in Texas
showed large gains in math scores in the 1990s as a result of a series of reforms focusing
on standards, assessments, and accountability. Klein, Hamilton, McCaffrey and Stecher
(2005) investigate the validity of the gains and conclude that the results from NAEP data
and TAAS data does not correlate well and present different accounts of achievement.
According to TAAS scores, the gap in Texas is much smaller than suggested by NAEP
and decreasing greatly. In the news release about the later report, RAND argues that the
Grissmer report is not directly comparable to Klein report and both found at least some
gains in Texas NAEP scores (RAND, 2000). The discussion even went further when
Hanushek (2001) criticized both reports in his review titled “Deconstructing RAND”.
The reports’ authors responded in “RAND versus Hanushek”, published in the Education
Next journal (2001). Hanushek (2001) argues that the evidence from the reports does not
provide enough evidence to conclude that the additional resources led to student
achievement gains in Texas. He also argues that the gap between the TAAS than on
NAEP scores is not accurate because TAAS represents Texas’ own curriculum and
NAEP represents a generic test of national content, so the two tests may be testing
different skills. As a comprehensive test that cover a lengthy period, TAAS has been used
in many analyses to date. However, it is important to be keep these discussions about
reliability in mind when considering the results.
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Table 5.4 Mean Differences in the Achievement Scores for Traditional Public Schools in
Texas: All Tests Summed Across All Grades and Math Test Summed Across All Grades

1995-96
2001-02
Difference
1995-96
Control
2001-02
Difference
Difference-in-diff.

Treatment

TAAS All Tests % Passing
Sum of 3-8 & 10

TAAS Math Test % Passing
Sum of 3-8 & 10

C1
60.82
81.04
20.22
64.02
83.94
19.92
0.3

C1
66.38
89.32
22.94
69.65
91.39
21.74
1.2

C2
58.99
79.79
20.80
64.90
84.38
19.48
1.32

C3
59.37
79.66
20.29
63.21
83.22
20.01
0.28

C2
64.63
88.46
23.83
70.45
91.68
21.23
2.6

C3
64.88
88.28
23.40
68.83
90.90
21.97
1.43

Tables 5.5 and 5.6 present the results from the regression models that estimate the
overall pass rate in all tests and in math test. Similar to tables in previous chapters, the
three columns show the three competition measures (C1, C2 and C3) used throughout the
dissertation. In achievement models, percentage of the non-Hispanic white students and
percentage of free-lunch eligible students in the school and the school level studentteacher ratio is included in the models in addition to the county level controls used in the
previous chapters.
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Table 5.5 Estimated Effect of Charter Schools on Public Schools in TEXAS: TAAS All
Tests Percent Passing, Sum of 3-8 & 10

C2

(I)
.864**
(0.406)
-

C3

-

2.825**
(0.381)
-

T

21.537**
(0.401)
22.767**
(4.851)

21.890**
(0.467)
24.970**
(4.686)

2.192**
(0.463)
22.222***
(0.483)
26.378***
(5.184)

-0.405**
(0.062)
-7.741**
(1.755)
9.084
(14.527)
38.526**
(2.512)
-1.684
(1.153)
0.065
(0.090)
134.902**
(22.229)
0.7396

-0.360**
(0.061)
-8.498**
(1.753)
6.276
(14.490)
39.509**
(2.508)
-1.439
(1.146)
0.071
(0.089)
141.270**
(22.116)
0.7412

-0.380**
(0.064)
-6.481**
(1.772)
7.720
(14.534)
38.493**
(2.510)
-1.874
(1.148)
0.067
(0.090)
117.103**
(22.773)
0.7396

C1

Proportion of white nonHispanics in the 5–19 year
old population
Proportion of 5–17 year olds
in poverty
Log of total population
Proportion of private school
enrollment
Percentage of students who
are non-Hispanic white
Percentage of students who
are eligible for free-lunch
Student-teacher ratio
Constant
2

(II)
-

Adjusted R
Note: (p<.01)= ***, (p>.05)=**, (p<.10)=*, standard errors are in parenthesis

99

(III)
-

Table 5.6 Estimated Effect of Charter Schools on Public Schools in TEXAS: TAAS Math
Tests Percent Passing, Sum of 3-8 & 10
(I)

(II)

(III)

-

-

C2

2.541**
(0.425)
-

-

C3

-

3.978**
(0.403)
-

22.694**
(0.495)
19.127**
(5.140)

23.187**
(0.493)
22.638**
(4.952)

3.095**
(0.490)
23.657**
(0.512)
24.668**
(5.491)

-0.552**
(0.066)
-8.508**
(1.861)
9.931
(15.398)
39.674**
(2.662)
0.061
(1.222)
0.053
(0.095)
154.284**
(23.570)
0.6952

-0.484**
(0.065)
-9.580**
(1.854)
5.931
(15.319)
41.114**
(2.651)
0.441
(1.211)
0.061
(0.094)
162.977**
(23.390)
0.6986

-0.512**
(0.067)
-6.727**
(1.878)
7.709
(15.400)
39.685**
(2.659)
-0.169
(1.216)
0.056
(0.095)
128.753**
(24.139)
0.6955

C1

T
Proportion of white nonHispanics in the 5–19 year
old population
Proportion of 5–17 year olds
in poverty
Log of total population
Proportion of private school
enrollment
Percentage of students who
are non-Hispanic white
Percentage of students who
are eligible for free-lunch
Student-teacher ratio
Constant
2

Adjusted R
Note: (p<.01)= ***, (p>.05)=**, (p<.10)=*, standard errors are in parenthesis

The coefficient on time dummy shows that the overall pass rate in all subjects and
in math increased from 1995 to 2001, even after controlling for demographic changes and
private schools enrollment. The change is approximately 20 percentage points across all
specifications. The coefficients of C1, C2 and C3 show the difference-in-differences
estimates, the changes unique to schools that face competition after the introduction of
charter schools. The regression results suggest that presence of charter schools in a
county leads to an additional .864 percentage point increase in traditional public schools’
overall pass rates. The coefficient is insignificant before the inclusion of the control
variables, however, once the control variables are included, the overall positive effect is
significant across other specifications. For the schools that experience direct competition
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within their 5-mile radius, the overall pass rate increases by 2.83 percentage points.
Relative to schools in counties with below median charter school enrollment, schools in
high enrollment counties experienced a 2.19-point rise in their overall pass rates.
In the models for math test pass rates, similar results are observed. The impact in
the baseline model is positive and the size of the coefficient increases with the addition of
the controls and remains highly significant across all models. Schools that have charter
schools in their county or have at or above median charter school enrollment at the
county level experience a statistically significant rise of almost 3 percentage points in
their math test pass rates. Schools that have charters within their 5-mile radius experience
the largest change in math pass rates with an increase of almost 4 percentage points.
Aside from the impacts of charter schools, increases in the percent of white nonHispanics in the 5 to 19 year old county population and the school are positively related
to both the overall and the math pass rates in public schools. Increases in the county’s
share of school-age population in poverty leads to declines in overall pass rates. Overall,
all schools in Texas experienced achievement gains during this period; however, the size
of the gain is higher in treatment schools. We observe an overall positive coefficient on
the competition variable, and the size of the effect typically increases with the inclusion
of the control variables.

Ohio
Ohio tests students at grades 4, 6, 9 and 12 in writing, reading, mathematics,
citizenship, and science. All of the tests are based on learning outcomes adopted by the
State Board of Education. The percentage passed on standardized statewide tests in
citizenship, math, reading, and writing for grades 4, 6, 9 and 10 (only grades 4 and 6 for
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science tests) are available through Ohio Department of Education web site. The four
dependent variables used in these analyses are the percentage passed on standardized
statewide tests in math and reading at grade 4 and grade 10.
Table 5.7 and 5.8 show mean differences in pass rates in math and reading,
respectively, across groups of schools. Charter schools are concentrated in certain
counties in Ohio, so the county specification and the enrollment specification refer to the
same schools in Ohio, and thus the results are identical. The estimates show that the pass
rates in math and reading in traditional public schools located in counties with above
median charter enrollments or that have charter schools in their county or within their 5mile radius rise from 1995-96 school year to 2001-02 school year. The results show that
there is a bigger increase in the pass rates of the control schools, except in the reading
pass rates at grade 10. The size of the difference is slightly larger in math compared to
reading.
Table 5.7. Means Differences in the Achievement Scores for Traditional Public Schools
in Ohio: Passing rate, Math Grade4 and Grade10
Math Grade 4
% Passed

1995-96
2001-02
Difference
1995-96
Control
2001-02
Difference
Difference-in-differen.

Treatment

C1
41.58
57.30
15.72
46.60
66.63
20.03
-4.31

C2
37.45
53.04
15.59
48.44
67.75
19.31
-3.72

Math Grade 10
% Passed

C3
41.29
55.81
14.52
45.07
64.19
19.12
-4.60
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C1
78.60
82.76

C2
75.19
79.83
4.17

81.87
89.57
7.70
-3.53

C3
78.71
81.01
4.64

82.71
89.88
7.17
-2.53

2.30
81.07
88.51
7.44
-5.14

Table 5.8. Means Differences in the Achievement Scores for Traditional Public Schools
in Ohio: Passing rate, Reading Grade4 and Grade10
Reading Grade 4
% Passed

1995-96
2001-02
Difference
1995-96
Control
2001-02
Difference
Difference-in-differen.

Treatment

C1
41.31
62.09
19.78
46.48
71.87
25.39
-5.61

C2
38.20
57.42
19.22
48.50
73.20
24.70
-5.48

Reading Grade 10
% Passed

C3
41.92
59.91
17.99
45.28
69.59
24.31
-6.32

C1
93.28
96.05

C2
91.83
95.28
2.77

94.93
97.74
2.81
-0.04

C3
92.49
95.51
3.45

95.26
97.83

3.02
94.74
97.50

2.57
0.88

2.76
0.26

Tables 5.9 and 5.10 present the results from the regression models that estimate
the pass rate in math test for grade 4 and grade 10. Three columns show results for three
measures after the same set of control variables are included. Unlike Texas, the results in
Ohio show overall negative effects. For the schools that experience direct competition
within their 5-mile radius, the math pass rate drops by 1.5 at grade 4, but the coefficient is
not significant. Relative to schools in counties with below median charter school
enrollment, schools in high enrollment counties experienced a3.6-point decline in their
math pass rates. At grade 10, relative to schools in counties with below median charter
school enrollment, schools in high enrollment counties experienced a 7-point decline in
their math pass rates. The spatial specification shows negative results for math pass rates,
but the coefficients are not significant.
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Table 5.9 Estimated Effect of Charter Schools on Public Schools in Ohio: Passing rate,
Math Grade4

C2

(I)
-2.614*
(1.234)
-

C3

-

-1.531
(0.998)
-

T

18.483**
(0.994)
26.342
(37.285)

18.648**
(0.989)
53.653
(33.268)

-3.605*
(1.225)
18.446**
(0.990)
44.591
(33.043)

-65.952*
(26.032)
19.922*
(9.099)
-46.504
(31.113)
33.115**
(6.482)
0.489
(1.729)
-0.213
(0.124)
-231.670
(125.778)
0.7149

-56.590*
(25.278)
24.237**
(8.808)
-52.348
(30.972)
33.776**
(6.471)
1.067
(1.761)
-0.221
(0.124)
-309.110**
(117.824)
0.7158

-80.702*
(26.985)
14.966
(9.407)
-42.381
(31.132)
33.115**
(6.482)
0.728
(1.728)
-0.212
(0.123)
-185.183
(126.729)
0.7168

C1

Proportion of white nonHispanics in the 5–19 year
old population
Proportion of 5–17 year
olds in poverty
Log of total population
Proportion of private school
enrollment
Percentage of students who
are non-Hispanic white
Percentage of students who
are eligible for free-lunch
Student-teacher ratio
Constant
2

(II)
-

(III)
-

Adjusted R
Note: (p<.01)= ***, (p>.05)=**, (p<.10)=*, standard errors are in parenthesis
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Table 5.10 Estimated Effect of Charter Schools on Public Schools in Ohio: Passing rate,
Math Grade10
(I)
-3.179**

C1

(II)
-

(III)
-7.038**

C2

(1.071)
-

C3

-

-0.488
(0.931)
-

8.624**
(0.824)
2.857
(36.355)

8.966**
(0.821)
53.441
(32.571)

8.258**
(0.809)
-0.829
(32.289)

-66.297**

-94.123**

(27.225)

-53.666**
(20.045)
2.786
(7.401)
-16.458
(27.161)

24.615*
(10.404)
4.037
(3.232)
-0.044
(0.126)
109.373

24.840*
(10.532)
3.995
(3.257)
-0.054
(0.127)
-12.851

17.083
(10.294)
2.460
(3.178)
-0.032
(0.124)
198.412

(104. 064)
0.7487

(96.529)
0.7458

(99. 730)
0.7863

T
Proportion of white nonHispanics in the 5–19 year old
population
Proportion of 5–17 year olds in
poverty
Log of total population
Proportion of private school
enrollment
Percentage of students who are
non-Hispanic white
Percentage of students who are
eligible for free-lunch
Student-teacher ratio
Constant
2

(20.311)
-3.694

(7.666)
-4.836

Adjusted R
Note: (p<.01)= ***, (p>.05)=**, (p<.10)=*, standard errors are in parenthesis

(1.207)

(20.653)
-10.087

(7.514)
-5.560

(26.648)

Table 5.11 and 5.12 summarize the regression results from models with reading
pass rate at grade 4 and grade 10 respectively. At grade 4, models predict negative effects
across specifications. Public schools that have charter schools in their county experience
a statistically significant drop of 3.3 percentage points in their reading test pass rates. The
reading pass rates drop by 2.5 percentage points in schools that have charters within their
5-mile radius. The reading pass rates decline by 5.5 percentage points for schools that are
located in counties with above median charter school enrollment. None of the
coefficients are significant at grade 10.
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Overall, Ohio models are more likely to show significant effect in earlier grades.
All schools in Ohio experience achievement gains during this period; however, the size of
the gain is smaller for schools with charter schools nearby. We observe an overall
negative coefficient on the competition variable, especially in grade 4 in both math and
reading pass rates of public schools experiencing a certain degree of charter competition.
Table 5.11. Estimated Effect of Charter Schools on Public Schools in Ohio: Passing rate,
Reading Grade4

C2

(I)
-3.292**
(1.068)
-

C3

-

-2.464**
(0.864)
-

T

25.246**
(0.860)
46.377
(32.271)

25.429**
(0.856)
76.505**
(28.787)

-5.542**
(1.055)
25.126**
(0.854)
63.502*
(28.482)

-46.621*
(22.526)
4.862
(7.875)
-9.074
(26.922)
18.461**
(5.608)
-4.376**
(1.483)
-0.101
(0.107)
-59.074
(108.882)
0.7732

-37.460
(21.870)
10.074
(7.621)
-16.118
(26.792)
18.994**
(5.597)
-3.472*
(1.512)
-0.118
(0.108)
-149.546
(101.961)
.7731

-73.866*
(23.248)
-4.186
(8.111)
-0.673
(26.837)
19.745**
(5.547)
-3.987**
(1.477)
-0.103
(0.106)
40.113
(109.292)
0.7755

C1

Proportion of white nonHispanics in the 5–19 year old
population
Proportion of 5–17 year olds in
poverty
Log of total population
Proportion of private school
enrollment
Percentage of students who are
non-Hispanic white
Percentage of students who are
eligible for free-lunch
Student-teacher ratio
Constant
2

(II)
-

(III)
-

Adjusted R
Note: (p<.01)= ***, (p>.05)=**, (p<.10)=*, standard errors are in parenthesis
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Table 5.12. Estimated Effect of Charter Schools on Public Schools in Ohio: Passing rate,
Reading Grade10

C2

(I)
-0.856
(0.696)
-

C3

-

1.154
(0.589)
-

T

1.764**
(0.533)
-34.636
(23.531)

2.637**
(0.489)
-10.627
(20.911)

-0.412
(0.793)
1.813**
(0.535)
-23.380
(21.362)

-38.001**
(13.172)
0.286
(4.981)
-31.219
(17.595)
23.493**
(6.572)
9.273**
(2.010)
-0.138
(0.081)
109.962
(67.590)
0.5368

-31.615*
(12.890)
3.042
(4.770)
-36.827*
(17.407)
24.690**
(6.589)
9.027**
(2.011)
-0.125
(0.082)
93.963
(62.775)
0.5379

-36.742**
(13.699)
1.365
(4.984)
-33.389
(17.554)
23.257**
(6.629)
9.178**
(2.014)
-0.138
(0.082)
87.502
(66.134)
0.5359

C1

Proportion of white nonHispanics in the 5–19 year
old population
Proportion of 5–17 year olds
in poverty
Log of total population
Proportion of private school
enrollment
Percentage of students who
are non-Hispanic white
Percentage of students who
are eligible for free-lunch
Student-teacher ratio
Constant
2

(II)
-

(III)
-

Adjusted R
Note: (p<.01)= ***, (p>.05)=**, (p<.10)=*, standard errors are in parenthesis

Florida
The only publicly available school level data that covers 1995 to 2001 is the
Florida Writing Assessment Program (FWAP), which was implemented in grades 4, 8,
and 10. The assessment is designed to measure students' proficiency in writing responses
to assigned topics within a designated testing period. For the Florida Writing Assessment,
students are given 45 minutes to read their assigned topic, plan what to write, and then
write their responses. They are scored on a scale of 1 to 6 for narrative and expository.
These scores are inherently less objective because of the nature of the test and the writing
test is by no means a complete or even a good indicator of achievement. Nevertheless, I
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report some results from similarly specified models below. The dependent variables for
these models are percent of students who scored 4 or above at grade 4 and 10. Table 5.13
provides the summary results for the estimated effect of charter schools on public
schools’ writing scores at grade 4 and grade 10.
At grade four, the results are mixed. There are no significant effects in schools
with charters within 5-mile radius or the county. Interestingly, for schools in counties
with at or above median charter school enrollment, the regression results show a positive
effect for both expository and narrative writing scores. The size of the effect declines
with additional controls. None of models shows significant results at grade 10.
Table 5.13 Summary Table for the Estimated Effect of Charter Schools on Public Schools
in Florida: Percent scored 4 or above, Writing Grade4 and Grade 10
percent of students who
scored 4 or above
Base model
W/Controls
percent of students who
scored 4 or above
Base model
W/Controls

Grade 4 Expository
C1
C2
0.902
-1.017
(1.327)
(0.816)
0.048
-1.438
(1.365)
(0.835)

C3
3.605**
(0.786)
2.892**
(0.825)

Grade 10 Expository
C1
C2
C3
-3.450
-1.398
-2.279
(2.050)
(1.582)
(1.520)
-2.649
-1.833
-1.982
(2.489)
(1.612)
(1.591)

Grade 4 Narrative
C1
C2
-1.148
0.664
(1.453)
(0.893)
-0.962
0.662
(1.517)
(0.929)

C3
1.862*
(0.866)
1.876*
(0.919)

Grade 10 Narrative
C1
C2
C3
0.762
-0.776
-1.370
(2.337)
(1.798)
(1.729)
1.744
-0.930
-1.265
(2.849)
(1.845)
(1.822)

Summary Discussion
Performance of charter schools is already under close scrutiny. As the charter
movement matures, it will also become critical to understand whether charter schools
affect achievement in traditional public schools. The review of the studies focusing on
this question so far exhibit mixed results in different states. The results from this study
are no exception.
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The regression models for Texas schools suggest that charter schools contribute to
increases in the overall pass rates and math pass rates. Once the control variables are
included, the positive effect remains significant across all specifications and the size of
the effect typically increases. Although these results are encouraging, the findings from
the earlier chapters showed that charter schools also contributed to declines in the share
of free-lunch eligible students in Texas traditional public schools. Therefore, part of the
positive effect may be due to the changes in the composition of the student groups. In
Florida, the regression results only show a positive effect for both expository and
narrative writing scores in schools in counties with at or above median charter school
enrollment at grade 4. However, this data is limited because it only includes writing test
scores at the school level. Earlier research report some positive effects for math test
scores as well. Sass (2006) had access to student level data in Florida and found that
competition from charters have a modest but positive impact on math scores, and
interestingly no impact on writing scores of traditional school students.
In contrast to Texas, public schools that face charter competition measured in all
three ways experience declines in their math pass rates in Ohio in both grade 4 and grade
10 and declines in reading pass rates at grade 4. The results raise interesting questions on
the possible causes of the contradictory findings in different states. Earlier results showed
that in Ohio, charter schools contributed to declines in the share of non-Hispanic white
students and increases in the share of free-lunch eligible students in public schools. So, it
is possible that some of the decline in public school test scores to be associated with
changes in the student composition of public schools. When the controls for school level
changes in the student composition is added to the models, the negative effect actually

109

shrinks, however it does not completely disappear. Other differences in charter legislation
and operations may also contribute to the negative effects. Further work is definitely
required to explain why these observed changes are taking place. In sum, the results
imply that in spite of the fact that charters serve still a small proportion of students, they
have effects on the aggregate performance of traditional public schools, at least in some
cases, as expected by the theory.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
As charter schools continue to proliferate, their impact on the public education
system is becoming an increasingly important public policy question. Many discussions
of such system-wide effects revolve around the academic achievement issues; however,
this study focuses on changes in the composition of the student body and student-teacher
ratios as well as academic performance as other important dimensions of system-wide
effects created by the introduction of charter schools in the public education system. This
analysis provides additional empirical evidence from four states that have experienced a
certain degree of charter competition in the last decade by relying on a panel design and
school level data. In this chapter, first I will summarize the primary findings. Then, I will
discuss the limitations and policy implications of the study and possible extensions for
future research.
Primary Findings
Table 6.1 presents a summary of the findings across comparable models from four
states. The results based on these data consistently suggest that the introduction of charter
schools reduces the share of non-Hispanic white students from traditional public schools
in all four states. The estimates from the race models are negative and robust to county
level, spatial and enrollment based specification. Charter presence measured in all three
ways show significant effects, but the effect size generally reduces in the models with
spatially more precise measures. The additional controls also reduce the effect size, but
all coefficients remain significant. The effect size ranges from 1.0 to 1.9 percentage
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points. These results from Texas, Florida, Ohio and New Jersey are consistent with the
findings by Dee and Fu (2004) in Arizona and Ross (2005) in Michigan.
The analyses also show that charter school presence in these states affects the
share of free-lunch eligible students in traditional public schools in three of these four
states. The size and direction of the effects vary across states. The regression models for
free-lunch eligible students did not suggest significant results for New Jersey, which has
very few charter schools compared to the other states (only 51 charter schools by 2001),
so this may simply suggest that charter schools are still too few to adequately pressure the
public school system. The regression results showed that the existence of charter schools
contributed to the reduction of the share of free-lunch eligible students in traditional
public schools in Texas, but increased the share of free-lunch eligible students in Ohio. In
Florida, the models show a significant increase in the share of free-lunch eligible students
only if the traditional public school has charter schools within its close proximity.
The analyses show mixed effects on student-teacher ratios in traditional public
schools. In Texas, charter schools seemed to have no effect on student-teacher ratios of
traditional public schools. In Florida and Ohio, the models show significant drops in the
student-teacher ratios of traditional public schools. In Florida schools, all three
specifications showed significant negative impacts, although the size of the effect
becomes smaller with the inclusion of controls. In Ohio, schools that have charter schools
within their 5-mile radius experience experienced the biggest drop and the inclusion of
the controls makes the effect stronger in this case. For New Jersey schools, schools
located in counties with one or more charter schools experienced an increase in the
student-teacher ratios, but other specifications did not show significant effects. Previous

112

research found that student-teacher ratios increased in Arizona public schools due to
charter competition (Dee & Fu, 2004). I also ran the same models for schools located in
counties with high poverty rates to investigate whether competitive effects become more
significant or larger in higher poverty districts compared to lower poverty districts.
Overall, the similarly specified models do not show significant differences in studentteacher ratios of schools in poor counties compared with the original results for all
schools, except some models in New Jersey.
Table 6.1 Summary of Findings: Effects of Charter Competition on Regular Public
Schools

Texas

Florida

New
Jersey
Ohio

C1
C2
C3
C1
C2
C3
C1
C2
C3
C1
C2
C3

Percent nonHispanic white
students
Negative effect
Negative effect
Negative effect
Negative effect
Negative effect
Negative effect
Negative effect
Negative effect
Negative effect
Negative effect
Negative effect
No effect

Percent freelunch eligible
students
Negative effect
Negative effect
Negative effect
No effect
Positive effect
No effect
No effect
No effect
No effect
Positive effect
Positive effect
Positive effect

Student-teacher
ratio
No effect
No effect
No effect
No effect
Negative effect
Negative effect
Positive effect
No effect
No effect
No effect
Negative effect
No effect

Performance
Positive effect
Positive effect
Positive effect
No Effect
No effect
Positive effects
Negative effect
Negative effect
Negative effect

* C1 refers to the county level measure (Public schools that have one or more charter schools in their host
county); C2 refers to the spatial measure (Public schools that have one or more charter schools within their
5-mils radius); C3 refers to the enrollment measure (Public schools that are in counties with above median
charter enrollment). * The reported finding shows the effects from the full regression models with controls.

In chapter 4, I have used publicly available school-level performance data. The
summary table sows the overall results from multiple outcome measures. The analyses
show that the charter schools contribute to improvements in traditional public schools’
overall and math pass rates in Texas. The positive impact is consistent across all models
and consistent with the findings by Booker, Gilpatric, Gronberg and Jansen (2004),
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Gronberg and Jansen (2005), and Bohte (2005). In Ohio, I analyzed the changes in pass
rates in math and reading at grade 4 and 10. Unlike Texas public schools, Ohio public
schools experience overall negative effects. Public schools that have charter schools in
their county, within their 5-mile radius or have at or above median charter school
enrollment at their host county experience a statistically significant drop in both their
math and reading test pass rates at grade 4. The schools also experience drops in math
pass rates at grade 4, but no effect on the reading pass rates at grade 10. There are no
comparable studies that focus on competitive effects in Ohio. In Florida, I was only able
to examine test scores on writing. Overall, the results were not significant at both grade 4
and 10. Only for schools in counties with at or above median charter school enrollment,
the regression results show a positive effect for both expository and narrative writing
scores at grade 4. One previous study finds no impact of charter schools in reading scores
in Florida’s traditional public schools (Sass, 2006).
In less than two decades, charter schools spread across the United States and
established themselves as one of the most significant and most debated educational and
political reform movements. The charter school movement is supported by a broad range
of advocates from different sides on the political spectrum. On the one hand, the
movement endorses ideas like competition, decentralization, organizational change, and
flexibility. On the other hand, the movement is in tune with many core values of public
education as charter schools are public, tuition-free, non-selective in their admission,
non-religious, and accountable. Both sides unite in the ultimate purpose of improving
student learning. The supporters of the reform also believe that the charter schools will
lead to positive or neutral effects on educational equity. In sum, evaluations of the effects
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of charter schools need to address both their impact on academic achievement of their
students and non-choosers and the impact of charter reform on educational equity.
This study attempts to provide a comprehensive assessment of the charter school
impact on traditional public schools. Findings from previous research on systemic effects
do not provide conclusive answers. Reasons for this inconsistency include variation in the
analysis techniques in different studies, as well as the variation in the programs. The
political environment shapes and guides all educational reform movements including
charter schools. The findings from this study also emphasize the importance of
considering state context and empirical measures. The results clearly show different
results in different states for some outcome areas. Although all models show a decline in
the share of white non-Hispanic students, charter schools seem to affect share of poor
students and test scores in opposite directions across Texas and Ohio. I look into the
histories of charter school movement in these two states to seek some clues to better
understand this disparity. In the beginning, Texas legislature issued a provision which
may have shaped incentives of some charter school entrepreneurs. The Texas Legislature
passed legislation establishing state charter schools in 1995. Texas first allowed the
creation of 20 open-enrollment charter schools, and then by 1997 increased this number
to 100 open-enrollment charter schools and an unlimited number of open-enrollment
charter schools serving students at risk of failure or dropping out of school. If a school
enrolled 75 percent or more at-risk students, it would qualify as a 75 Percent Rule charter
school and not be subject to the cap (TCER, 2002). This provision was eliminated in
2001, but the negative results regarding the share of free-lunch eligible students in the
models may reflect the transfer of the at-risk students from traditional schools to charters
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under the 75 percent rule. If this is the case, then the observed gains in the pass rates in
traditional Texas public schools may also reflect the effects of changing peer composition
due to student transfer under the 75 percent rule. Similar to findings from other states like
Michigan and North Carolina, this study also finds some neutral and mostly negative
effects in Ohio.
The results also show variation due to different measures for some outcome areas.
For example, in Florida, the models show a significant increase in the share of free-lunch
eligible students only if the traditional public school has charter schools within its close
proximity. If the study relied only on the simple county dummy or the enrollment
measure, all models from the state would show insignificant results. Considering
different contextual dynamics proves to be critical for being able to make meaningful
generalizations.
In sum, the findings from the study suggest that introduction of charter schools in
the educational landscape has affected student distributions, and at least in some cases,
student-teacher ratios and performance of traditional public schools. During the study
period, only about 1.2 percent of the students in the United States were served by charter
schools. Despite the relatively small number of charter schools in these four states, the
results show significant effects in multiple outcome areas. Especially, the results from
race models suggest that there may be some consistent sorting of students in public
schools on the aggregate level. This may happen unintentionally and regardless of the
successes and goals of individual charter schools, but if we fail to consider concerns
about systemic effects, we risk exacerbating existing stratification in public education.
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Therefore, policymakers need to keep the effect of choice on non-choosers in perspective
in designing and amending the charter policy.
Limitations, Discussion and Extensions
The present study has certain limitations that need to be taken into account when
considering the results and contributions. However, the results as well as the limitations
of this study highlight interesting possible avenues for future research. Charter school
reform is a complex phenomenon that has very extensive repercussions on the public
education system. Each charter school serves different purposes and reflects diverse ideas
of their constituents, and as such, a simple classification of charters and traditional
schools is not an easy task. In the future, we definitely need more studies that look into
the differences among charter schools to identify the factors that make a difference.
Charter reform is also shaped by the particular state legislatures and implemented in
multiple ways. Because of this inherent differentiation, no single study can fully
characterize the systemic impacts created by charter schools in a conclusive manner. The
extremely mixed results from the literature on various aspects of charter schools can
attest to that account.
In this study, this extensive and complex phenomenon has been studied from a
rather narrow empirical perspective. This section reviews some of the possible caveats
that should be considered while interpreting these results. First, this study uses schoollevel data. While the data demonstrates evidence of charter induced changes in four states
across this period, we can only observe the aggregate changes. Charter schools vary a
great deal based on flexibility and uniqueness that is inherent in charter school laws.
Therefore, it is important to interpret the results as average changes that do not apply to
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each individual charter school. It is also important to note that this study merely points
out a pattern, it does not explain why these changes are taking place. For example, why is
there a decline in the average proportion of white and free lunch eligible students served
by public schools in these states in the face of charter presence? Do the charter schools
disproportionately serve white and economically advantaged students? Or do charter
schools choose to locate in areas with already high levels of minority concentration and
turn into a factor in parent’s preferences to move to areas with less minority students or to
send their children to private schools? These questions are of central importance and
definitely require specific attention.
Second, the analysis only deals with four states and cannot be generalized to other
states, which may have entirely different experiences with charters. Even among these
four states, the results show a great deal of variation in some outcomes. For example,
why does the size of the effects, especially in the models investigating the changes in the
share of free-lunch eligible students, vary this much across states? Why do we see the
largest effects in Ohio schools? Educational Management Organizations (EMOs) are very
actively involved in the charter schools in Ohio (Hill & Lake, 2005). Could there be a
relationship between the positive and large effect sizes and the possible inclination of
some profit oriented educational management organizations to serve less disadvantaged
and less costly students? What other policy variables such as racial balance provisions or
transportation requirements in the charter school legislation have affected these patterns?
Further research should examine these and other characteristics of schools and policies.
As the charter school experiment continues, we can observe the effects in other states in
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future studies and hopefully discover differences in operation and legislation that will
lead to outcomes that are more favorable.
Third, as discussed in the methodology chapter, endogeneity is a common
problem in policy and program evaluations that use observational data. If the charter
school location is partly determined by pre-existing trends such as public school quality,
endogeneity could bias the estimates of the coefficients. In this study, to address this
concern, I have used carefully selected control variables and school level fixed effects
models utilizing the difference-in-differences estimation. However, school choice in
general and charter schools in particular are complex policies involving individual choice
and it is difficult to account for all sources of potential endogeneity. More research is
definitely needed on the location choice of charter schools to clarify the existence, size
and direction of the potential bias. Finally, the size of the observed effects are very small,
however this is probably expected because the number of schools are still very few
compared to the number of traditional schools.
Many educational professionals and parents embrace charter schools, because
they bring choice and potential for innovation and freedom. As a result, number of
charter schools and the number of students served by them are growing. As adoption and
revision of charter school legislation continues, analysis of the overall cost and benefits
of the charter school experience is helpful and necessary for state policy makers as they
struggle to ensure fair and effective adoption and implementation of choice programs.
Keeping these constraints in mind, this study provides evidence on charter school effects
on the student composition of traditional public schools from four states. As the charter
school experiment continues to flourish across the country, it is very important to
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understand both the intended and the unintended consequences of this new reform to
develop better charter school policies.
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